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Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the
Rule 10b-5 Comparisons
MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN*

Thepassageof the WilliamsAct in 1968 addeda set ofprovisionsto the

SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 to govern tender offers. In this article,
ProfessorLoewenstein examines the antifraudprovision of the Williams

Act, codjfed as section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and the development of decisional law under it. After discussing the
proprietyof inferring aprivate cause of actionfrom section 14(e), Professor Loewenstein argues that the judiciary's reliance on rule 10b-5
precedentsto set the bounds of the 14(e) cause of action is unwarranted
He concludes: 1) that scienter should not be an element of the section
14(e) action,"2) that section 14(e) plaintiffs should only be required to
prove reliance if it is necessary to prove causation,-3) that a tender offeror shouldhave standingto seek equitablerelief(f targetmanagement
breachesitsfiduciary duty to its shareholdersand the breach interferes

with the tender offer, and4) that the SEC didnot exceed its rulemaking
authority in promulgating rule 14e-3 because section 14(e) is broad
enough to support 14e-3"s apparent prohibition of trading activities
otherwise permissible under rule 10b-5.

When Congress enacted the Williams Act' in 1968 to regulate cash tender
offers, it added to the regulatory scheme of the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 a broad antifraud provision for the regulation of tender offers, codified
as section 14(e). 3 A 1970 amendment to section 14(e) granted the Securities5
and Exchange Commission 4, broad rulemaking powers under the section.
Neither section 14(e) nor any other section of the Williams Act expressly affords a private right of action for enforcement of its provisions. The lower
federal courts, however, have found implied private rights of action to enforce
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
The author wishes to thank his colleagues, Professors Clifford J. Calhoun and Ted J. Fiflis for their
helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article, and the firm of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meager & Flom, New York, New York, for furnishing a copy of the legislative history of the
Williams Act.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976). The Williams Act is the popular name of Pub. L. No.
90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), originally entitled: Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in
Corporate Takeover Bids. The Act was passed in response to an increasing number of cash tender
offers and the abuses perceived in those transactions. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3
[hereinafter Senate Report], reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2812. The Act
added a new section 13(d) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requiring certain disclosures by
persons who acquire more than 10% (later amended to 5%) of any registered equity security, and a new
section 14(d) requiring that certain disclosures be made in connection with a tender offer. In addition,
the Act added a new section 13(e) to regulate purchases by an issuer of its own securities; a new section
14() to require certain disclosures of specified changes in the board of directors of an acquired company; and section 14(e), a broad antifraud rule applicable to all tender offers.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976) [hereinafter the Exchange Act].
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
4. Hereinafter the SEC or the Commission.
5. Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84 Stat. 1497, 1497-98 (1970).
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various provisions of the Williams Act, including section 14(e). 6
In finding a private right of action under section 14(e) and shaping the ele-7
ments of that cause of action, the federal courts have looked to rule 1Ob-5,
promulgated under the general antifraud provision of the Exchange Act,8 for
guidance. 9 Similarly, rules adopted by the Commission under section 14(e)
have been analyzed with reference to case law developed under rule 10b-5.10
At first blush, interpreting section 14(e) and the rules adopted thereunder in
light of the decisional law pertaining to rule lOb-5 has some appeal, since the
language of section 14(e) and rule 1Ob-5 are similar. *' However, rule 1 b-5
and section 14(e) do differ in language as well as congressional purpose and
legislative history. These differences, therefore, may require a different interpretation and application of the two sections. Moreover, section 14(e) also
6. See cases cited infra notes 29-33 and 134. See also Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216,
1224 (4th Cir. 1980) (recognizing right of target corporation to maintain action seeking injunctive relief
under section 13(d)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294,
301 (D. Del. 1981) (recognizing right of tender offeror to maintain action for injunctive relief under
section 13(e)). But see Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 101 (N.D. I11.
1980) (refusing to recognize private cause of action under section 13(d)).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). For the text of rule lOb-5, see infra note 11.
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). The federal courts have long
recognized the existence of a private cause of action to enforce the proscriptions of rule lOb-5. See
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 686-87 (1983). Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) was the first case holding that a private remedy exists under rule lob-5.
Id at 514. In the years sinceKardon,a considerable body of law has developed around rule lob-5. See
generally A. JACOBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5 (Rev. Ed. 1980); A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS,
SECURITIEs FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD (1982).

9. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 337-65 and accompanying text. The most controversial of the.section 14(e) rules
has been rule 14e-3, which prohibits trading on the basis of nonpublic information about a planned
tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1982). For criticism of the rule, see Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule
14e-3, and Dirks: FairnessVersus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982); Peloso & Krause, Trading on Inside Information, 14 REv. SEc. REG. 941 (1981); Note, The Scope ofthe DisclosureDuty Under
SEC Rule 14e-3, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1055 (1981).
11. Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1982).
Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any
such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection,
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). The last sentence of section 14(e)
was added by the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act. Pub. L. No. 91-567, §5, 84 Stat. 1497-98
(1970).
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bears strong resemblance to other provisions of the federal securities laws, such
as section 17(a)1 2 of the Securities Act of 1933,13 the general antifraud provision of the Securities Act, and rule 14a-91 4 promulgated under the Exchange
Act, which prohibits fraud in connection with proxy solicitations. These latter
provisions have been interpreted differently than rule lOb-5.1 5 Finally, the interpretation of rule lOb-5 is always subject to the statutory language of section
10(b)1 6 of the Exchange Act; to the extent rule lOb-5 prohibits conduct not
prohibited by section 10(b), the rule is invalid. 17 Section 14(e), however, is not
subject to a similar limitation.
It is the thesis of this article that although a private right of action for damages may properly be inferred from section 14(e), 18 the wholesale incorporation of rule lOb-5 decisional law into the interpretation of section 14(e) and the
rules promulgated thereunder is unwarranted. In particular, section 14(e), in
contrast to rule 1Ob-5, may not require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
acted with scienter 19 or that the plaintiff relied on the defendant's misrepresentations or omissions in deciding on a course of action. 20 In addition, there may
be circumstances in which section 14(e) should provide relief for a breach of
fiduciary duty and other wrongdoings that are clearly not bases for recovery
under rule lOb-5. 2 1 Thus, this article takes issue, to some extent, with judges
who have limited the application of section 14(e) based on cases decided under
rule lOb-5, 22 and with commentators who have criticized
the Commission for
23
exceeding its rulemaking authority under section 14(e).
I.

THE

AVAILABILITY OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION

UNDER SECTION 14(e)
A.

PRIVATE DAMAGE ACTIONS UNDER SECTION

14(e)

Justice Stevens, dissenting in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.24 stated
that "[n]o one seriously questions the premise that Congress implicitly created
a private right of action when it enacted § 14(e) in 1968."25 The majority in
Piter, however, held that a defeated tender offeror did not have standing to
maintain an implied cause of action for damages under section 14(e), 2 6 ex12. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) [hereinafter the Securities Act].
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1982) (adopted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)).
15. With respect to section 17(a) of the Securities Act, compare Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02
(1980) (scienter must be demonstrated under section 17(a)(1), but not under 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3)) with
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (scienter a necessary element of section 10(b) or
rule lOb-5 violation). As to rule 14a-9, compare Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 130001 (2d Cir. 1973) (scienter might not be required in action under rule 14a-9 or section 14(a)) with Ernst
& Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 (scienter required in section 10(b) or rule lob-5 action).
16. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976).
17. Id
18. See infra text accompanying notes 133 and 155-56.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 185-235.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 236-76.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 277-336.
22. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
25. Id at 55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Id at 42.
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pressly reserving the questions of whether the shareholder-offerees of the target corporation would have standing 27 or whether a suit in equity for
injunctive relief would lie in favor of a tender offeror under section 14(e). 2 8
Numerous cases, before and after Piper, have explored the question of who has
standing to maintain an action for damages under section 14(e). The lower
federal courts have held that private damage actions may be inferred from
section 14(e) in favor of both tendering 29 and non-tendering 30 shareholderofferees, as well as option traders. 3 1 The courts have also found an implied
private action for injunctive relief in favor of target companies 32 and tender
33
offerors.
Justice Stevens' observation is factually correct-the availability of an implied private action under section 14(e) has not been seriously questioned.
This is due in large part to the tendency of the lower federal courts interpreting
section 14(e) to look for guidance to rule lOb-5 jurisprudence, 34 in which the
courts recognized a private cause of action for damages as early as 1946. 35
However, decisions subsequent to Piter demonstrate the Court's reluctance to
infer a private remedy in other contexts, 36 compelling a more thorough inquiry
into the basis for inferring a private damage action on behalf of shareholderofferees or a right to injunctive relief on behalf of tender offerors under section
14(e).
Since 1975, judicial efforts to determine whether a private cause of action
should be inferred from a federal statute have centered on a search for "legislative intent" 37 -that is, did Congress intend private litigants to have a private
cause of action to support their statutory rights? The Court has emphasized
27. Id at 42 n.28.
28. Id at 47 n.33.
29. See Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1281 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1982); Osofsky v.
Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1981); Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 267 (2d Cir. 1975).
30. See Hurwitz v. R.B. Jones Corp., 76 F.R.D. 149, 160 (W.D. Mo. 1977); McCloskey v. Epko
Shoes, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279, 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co., 387 F. Supp. 355,
359 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 92,591 at 98,707 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
31. See O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(option trader has standing under section 14(e) and rule 14e-3 to maintain action against "tippees" who
purchased call options from plaintiff knowing tender offer for shares subject to call option imminent).
But see Wulc v. Gulf& Western Indus., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 99, 104 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holder of nontransferable option rights does not have standing under section 14(e)).
32. Camelot Indus. Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
33. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1490 (1982); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
34. See, e.g., Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1281 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982); H.K.
Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 425-26 (1st Cir. 1973); Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1969); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F.
Supp. 1310, 1318, 1323-24 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Dyer v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 336 F. Supp.
890, 913-14 (D. Me. 1971). In Dyer, an early and influential decision in this area, the court wrote that
"[a] sensible and coherent interpretation of the provisions of the two statutes mandates implication of a
damage remedy under Section 14(e) corresponding to that available under Section 10(b). There is
every reason to believe that Congress intended the remedies to be similar." 336 F. Supp. at 914. The
court cited no authority for its observation that Congress intended the remedies to be similar as, indeed,
there is none.
35. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 687 (1983); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
36. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
37. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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the language and legislative history of statutes as guideposts to discerning this
intent.38 In Pitier, however, the Court's approach appears to assume that a
private action exists under section 14(e), and the only question was one of
standing. 39 Indeed, this is how Justice Stevens, in dissent, 40 and subsequent
lower courts 4 1 have interpreted the Court's opinion.
The Court gave no explanation in Piter for proceeding in this fashion. The
reason may relate to the Court's previous finding of an implied private right of
action under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act 42 and its recognition, without
discussion, of an implied private right of action for damages under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. 4 3 Because Congress was presumably aware that the federal courts had found that private damage remedies existed under these provisions at the time it adopted section 14(e), the Court may have simply assumed
that Congress intended the courts to treat section 14(e) in the same fashion.
The issue of when a federal court may properly infer a private right of action from a federal statute has been the subject of so many Supreme Court
opinions in recent years,44 however, and has created such divisiveness on the
Court, 45 that one cannot now reasonably conclude the Court would simply
38. This emphasis is particularly apparent from some of the Court's more recent cases on implied
causes of action. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981);
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
39. 430 U.S. at 24-25.
40. 430 U.S. at 55 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This case therefore does not present the same kind of
issue discussed in Cort v. Ash .

. . ,

namely, whether the statute created an implied private remedy.

Rather, the question presented here is who may invoke that remedy.") (emphasis in original).
41. See Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enter., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 484, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Humana, Inc. v.
American Medicorp, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Pitt, Standing to Sue Under
the Williams Act After Chris-Craft:A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117 (1978).

42. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964).
43. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 687 (1983); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
44. The more significant opinions include Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1844 (1982)
(private action inferred under Commodity Exchange Act); Middlesex City Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 11 (1981) (implied right of action under Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act denied); Texas Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 647 (1981) (private action for contribution from conspirators under
federal antitrust laws denied); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 98 (1981)
(private action for contribution under Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964
denied); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981) (private action for injunctive relief under
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 denied); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450
U.S. 754, 784 (1981) (private action for back wages under Davis-Bacon Act denied); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (private action for damages under section 206 of
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 denied; equitable relief held available under section 215 of Act);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 567 (1979) (private damage action under section 17(a)
of Exchange Act denied); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (private action to
enforce Title IX recognized); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (private action for
declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1302 of Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 denied); Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977) (private damage action denied to tender offeror under
section 14(e)); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 85 (1975) (private action for damages would not be inferred
from 18 U.S.C. § 610, which prohibits certain campaign contributions). See also Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975) (pre-Cort case in which Court refused to find
implied private right of action); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453, 464-65 (1975) (same). See generalo Frankel, ImpliedRights ofAction, 67 VA. L. REV. 553

(1981).
45. Several of the Court's implied right of action cases have given rise to vigorous dissenting opinions. Its most recent decision, for instance, Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982), was a 5 to 4
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assume that Congress intended a private cause of action without an express
statutory provision to that effect. Rather, should the issue of whether Congress
intended a private cause of action for the enforcement of section 14(e) come
before the Court again, it should receive the same close scrutiny as other implied rights of action cases. Justice Stevens' remark in Piper46 must be taken
with a grain of salt because he has been among the most willing of the Justices
to find an implied cause of action. Indeed, in the past eight years he wrote the
two leading decisions in which the Court recognized an implied cause of action
under a federal statute.47
An examination of the Court's opinions on implied causes of action reveals
that, although congressional intent has been the lodestar of each decision, as a
practical matter the party seeking a judicially-created cause of action bears the
burden of proving that Congress intended that result.48 Aside from its rule

lOb-5 decisions, 49 the Court has recognized an implied cause of action in only
three cases during the past eight years: TransamericaMortgage Advisors v.
51
Lewis, 50 Cannon v. University of Chicago, and Merrill Lynch v. Curran 52

The holding in Transamericais a limited one. The Court ruled that section
215 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, which voids contracts made in
violation of the Act, necessarily implies a right to equitable relief, such as rescission, injunction, and restitution.5 3 Cannon and Curran, however, are far
decision finding an implied cause of action under the Commodities Exchange Act. Id at 1844. Justice
Powell, writing for the dissenters, characterized one of the legal theories on which the majority relied as
"incompatible with our constitutional separation of powers, and ... without support in logic or in
law." Id at 1848 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also wrote an acrid dissenting opinion in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), where a 6-3 majority found a private action to
enforce Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Id at 717. On the other hand, Justice White
wrote a dissenting opinion for four members of the Court in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979), in which the majority failed to find an implied private right of action to enforce
section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Id. at 24. He wrote that in reaching its decision,
"the Court departs from established principles governing the implication of private rights of action by
confusing the inquiry into the existence of a right of action with the question of available relief." Id at
25. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 580 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 53 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
47. Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982) (5 to 4 decision); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (6 to 3 decision). The only other recent case in which the Court has recognized an implied private right of action, aside from cases involving rule lOb-5, is Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), which had a very limited holding. See infra note 53
and accompanying text. Justice Stevens in the Transamericadissent would have recognized far broader
private rights than the majority recognized. 444 U.S. at 36.
48. Justice Powell would go even further: "Henceforth, we should not condone the implication of
any private action from a federal statute absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact
intended such an action to exist." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
49. See supra note 43.
50. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
51. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
52. 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).
53. 444 U.S. at 19. In Transamerica, the plaintiff asserted that a private right of action could be
inferred from two provisions of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940: section 206, a general antifraud
section, and section 215(b), which voids contracts made in violation of the Act. Although the Court
denied the existence of a private damage action under section 206, id at 24, it recognized the right of a

party to seek equitable relief under section 215. Id at 19. The Court reasoned that the statutory language of section 215 implies a right to relief in a federal court; when Congress declared certain contracts void, it must have "intended that the customary legal incidents of voidness would follow,
including the availability of a suit for rescission or for an injunction against continued operation of the
contract, and for restitution." Id Thus, even though a private action was recognized in Transamerica,it
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more complicated and require closer scrutiny.
In Cannon the Court decided that Congress intended a private remedy for
the enforcement of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 54 The
Court examined the four factors it had first identified in the landmark case of
Cort v. Ash55 as crucial for determining whether a private right of action can
appropriately be recognized.
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plantifi? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be 56inappropriate
to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Although the Court considered all four Cort factors in Cannon5 7 it seemed
persuaded by the second factor-the legislative history indicating that Title IX
was patterned after and would be interpreted consistently with Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.58 Because the lower federal courts had construed
Title VI as providing an implied private right of action for several years prior
to the adoption of Title IX, the Court inferred that Congress intended Title IX
to be construed in the same fashion. 59 The Court concluded that this prior
jurisprudence was the "contemporary legal context" in which Congress was
acting, and that it would be considered by the Court in construing the legislahistory linking Title VI and Title
tion. 60 Express statements in the legislative
61
IX supported the Court's conclusion.
Curran also relied on the notion of a "contemporary legal context" to determine congressional intent. In this case, a five to four majority found an implied cause of action for damages under the Commodities Exchange Act
(CEA) on behalf of defrauded futures traders. 62 In contrast to Cannon, in
which all four Cort factors were examined, the Court in Curran simply relied
63
on the contemporary legal context of the legislation as the critical factor.
was limited to equitable relief. The Court did not find it necessary to employ the factors it set forth in
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), for determining when courts should recognize an implied private right
of action under a federal statute. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. It would be difficult to
conceive of the Court reaching a different conclusion on this point. Indeed, none of the Justices dissented from it. By comparison, the Court split 5 to 4 on whether a private action should be recognized

under section 206.
54.
55.
56.
57.

441 U.S.
422 U.S.
Id at 78
441 U.S.

at 717.
66 (1975).
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
at 694-709.

58. Id at 694-703.

59. Id at 703.
60. Id. at 699.
61. Id. at 694 n.16, 696 n.19, 701 n.30.
62. 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1837-48 (1975).
63. Id at 1839. Sec generally Selig & Steinmayer, The Curran Decisions, 15 REv. SEC. REG. 887,
889 (1982), in which the authors conclude that the majority in Curran announced a new standard for
determining when private ri hts should be inferred from a federal statute. Id at 889. This assessment

would appear to read more into the Court's opinion than is warranted. Rather, the Court was simply
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In Curran, the Court examined a statute that had been extensively amended
by Congress against a background of federal court decisions recognizing private causes of action. 64 Moreover, the CEA amendments occurred prior to the
Court's decision in Cort v. Ash, during an era when the Court more freely
inferred private causes of action from federal statutes. 65 In light of this background, the majority in Curran felt that "the initial focus must be on the state
of the law at the time the legislation was enacted. '66 The Court declared that
when Congress acts in a context in which an implied remedy has already been
recognized by the courts, the issue is whether Congress intended to preserve
the preexisting remedy. 67 To resolve this issue, the Court looked to the legislative history of the CEA amendments.
An examination of the legislative history of the CEA amendments convinced the majority that Congress intended to preserve the implied remedy. 68
The Court noted that the amendments, which provided new procedures
through which defrauded traders might seek relief for violations, must have
been intended to supplement rather than supplant the implied judicial remedy,
since the express purpose of the amendments was "to strengthen the regulation
of futures trading. '69 The Court also cited statements by witnesses at the hearings indicating that they assumed implied judicial remedies would survive the
amendments. 70 Moreover, the legislation included a savings clause providing
that "nothing in this section shall supercede or limit the jurisdiction conferred
on the courts of the United States or of any State."'7' To the majority, this was
72
"direct evidence of legislative intent to preserve the implied private remedy."
In Curran the Court found it unnecessary to examine the other Cort factors.73 Based on the CEA's legislative history alone, the Court was convinced
that Congress intended to preserve the implied remedy. 74 The only remaining
issues for the Court to address related to standing and the scope of the implied
remedy. In resolving these issues the Curran Court regarded reference to Cort
factors one, three, and four as unnecessary because the Court presumed that
judicial75developments to that point were impliedly incorporated into the
statute.
The Contemporary Legal Context Anaysis.
The "contemporary legal
context" notion, relied on in Cannon and Curran to support a private right of
action, is the basis for at least four arguments that an implied private cause of
convinced that, in this case, the context in which Congress was acting compelled the conclusion that it
must have intended the courts to provide private remedies for the enforcement of the CEA. The Court
did not suggest that the contemporary legal context in other cases would be similarly determinative.
64. 102 S. Ct. at 1839-40.
65. Id at 1837.
66. Id at 1839.
67. Id
68. Id at 1842.
69. Id at 1842 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88

Stat. 1389) (emphasis added).
70. 102 S. Ct. at 1842-43.
71. Id at 1843 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. III 1979)).
72. 102 S. Ct. at 1843.
73. Id. at 1844-46.
74. Id at 1844.
75. Id. at 184648.

1983]

TENDER OFFERS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION

1319

action for damages exists under section 14(e). First, if section 14(e) was in-

tended to provide a type of rule lOb-5 protection to shareholders faced with a
tender offer, as many federal courts have held,76 then surely the courts should
provide a damage remedy for its enforcement as they have for rule 1Ob-5. The
analogy to Cannon is apparent: a remedy was provided under Title IX in Can77
non because one had previously been judicially approved under Title VI.
The legislative history of the Williams Act, however, does not bear out the
underlying premise: there is no indication that section 14(e) was patterned
after rule lOb-5 or that rule lOb-5 jurisprudence should govern the interpretation of section 14(e). 78 Cannon thus does not provide direct support for inferring a cause of action under section 14(e). The legislative history relating Title
IX to Title VI in Cannon, pivotal to the outcome of that case, 79 has no parallel
in the legislative history of the Williams Act.
Second, one might argue that the federal courts were easily persuaded to
read a private right of enforcement into federal legislation at the time the Williams Act was under consideration, and, therefore, Congress likely assumed
that courts would provide a remedy under section 14(e). In particular, just four
years prior to the passage of the Williams Act, the Supreme Court decided J.L
76. See supra note 34.
77. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
78. Indeed, the legislative history of the Williams Act, which is rather extensive because substantial
hearings were held in both the Senate and the House, contains few references to section 14(e). One
interesting reference can be found in the written statement submitted to the Senate Committee by
William H. Painter, then professor of law at the University of Missouri at Kansas City. He pointed out
the similarities and differences among the various antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and
noted, on the basis of that analysis, that the precise meaning of section 14(e) was unclear. Full Diselosure of CorporateEquity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids Hearings on S. 510 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 140-41
(1967) [hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings].
The notion that Congress intended section 14(e) to be construed with reference to rule lOb-5 is traceable, at least in part, to Judge Gignoux's opinion in Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp.
890 (D. Me. 1971), which sets forth that conclusion. See supra note 34. Judge Gignoux cited two
district court opinions, Fabrikant v. Jacobellis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,686 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) and Neuman v. Electronic Speciality Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969) as support for his decision. 336 F. Supp. at 914. Fabrikant
was a decision on a motion to dismiss in which the court seemed to assume, without so stating, that a
cause of action for damages existed under section 14(e). 92,686 at 99,017-18. The court did not discuss
the relationship between section 14(e) and rule lOb-5.
The Neuman court did, however, discuss that relationship and, based on the following language
quoted from the House and Senate Reports describing section 14(e), concluded that the provisions were
to have the same interpretation: "This provision would affirm the fact that persons engaged in making
or opposing tender offers or otherwise seeking to influence the decision of investors of the outcome of
the tender offer are under an obligation to make full disclosure of material information to those with
92,591 at 98,705 (quoting Senate Report, supra note 1, and H.R. REP. No. 1711,
whom they deal."
90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1968). The court read this to mean that Congress intended "to 'affirm' the
applicability to tender offers of the standards of disclosure in Rule lob-5." 92,591 at 98,705. Neuman
may have ascribed a greater meaning to the word "affirm" than it can reasonably bear, since nowhere
do the House or Senate Reports mention rule lob-5. A more plausible reading of the Reports is that

Congress was relating section 14(e) to the rest of the Williams Act, "affirming" that a failure to disclose
under section 14(d), for instance, has consequence, viz., such failure is also made unlawful under section 14(e). See also Judge Friendly's opinion in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1969), which asserted that section 14(e) in effect applies rule lOb-5
to tender offers and which has been influential in the development of the notion that Congress intended
section 14(e) to be construed with reference to rule l0b-5.
79. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Case Co. v. Borak,8" in which it recognized the existence of a private cause of
action to enforce section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, the section regulating the
solicitati6n of proxies.8 1
The test the Court formulated in Borak was simple: a court will find an
implied cause of action if such an action is necessary to achieve the purpose
Congress intended in enacting the provision. 82 An application of this test to
section 14(e) could support the finding of an implied cause of action, at least
for target shareholders, and possibly others.8 3 However, such a finding requires
too much emphasis on the result in Borak and presumes an unrealistic congressional awareness of that decision. In fact, Borak was mentioned only twice
in the legislative
history of the Williams Act, and then not even by
84
legislators.
Putting to one side the scant mention of Borak, as well as implied remedies
generally, in the legislative history of the Williams Act, it is nevertheless obvious that the Court would not elevate Borak to a level of such preeminence. If
Borak governed the interpretation of federal statutes in the manner suggested
above, it alone would have determined the outcome in Cannon without the
80. 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964).
81. Id at 430-3 1.
82. Id at 433.

83. In Borak the plaintiff alleged that a merger was effected through the circulation of a false and
misleading proxy statement in contravention of an SEC rule promulgated pursuant to section 14(a). 377
U.S. at 427. The Court noted that the SEC could not make an independent examination of the facts of
all of the proxy statements filed with it, and thus to make effective the congressional purpose of protecting investors, "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary. .. "
Id at 433. The appropriate remedy, the Court concluded, depends upon the outcome of the trial on the
merits. Id at 435.
The congressional purpose in adopting the Williams Act was to afford a measure of protection,
through disclosure requirements and other provisions, for investors confronted with a tender offer.
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977). The SEC has insisted that providing a private
remedy under section 14(e) is necessary to ensure enforcement of the Williams Act and is consistent
with congressional intent. Id at 64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As in the case of proxy solicitations, private
enforcement of the tender offer provisions is necessary to supplement SEC action.
Although the Court seemed to recognize Borak as binding precedent in Pler,id at 16, Borak and
its approach have been limited in recent Supreme Court opinions on implied causes of action. See
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979) (Borak read narrowly to avoid creating
implied private rights of action under virtually every provision of Securities Acts); see also Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 735-36 (Powell, J., dissenting) (Borak constitutes singular and
aberrant interpretation of federal regulatory statute). Borak was distinguished in Piper because the
party seeking an implied cause of action in Ppver was not a member of the class of persons for whose
protection the statute was enacted. Piper,430 U.S. at 25. In Piper, the Court concluded that the Williams Act was enacted to protect investors confronted with a tender offer, not tender offerors. Id at 35.
Indeed, the Piper plaintiff was a "member ofthe class whose activities Congress intended to regulate for
the protection and benefit of an entirely distinct class, shareholder-offerees," and thus a defeated tender
offeror could not argue that an implied cause of action was a necessary supplement to the realization of
congressional purposes in enacting the Williams Act. Id at 37.
Even assuming, however, that shareholder-offerees, the "protected class," are seeking to invoke a
private remedy under section 14(e), reliance on Borak as supporting such an action is troubling. This
use of Borak implies that it governs the interpretation of all federal statutes enacted between 1964,
when it was decided, and 1975, when Cori was decided.
84. Two academicians, Professors Carlos L. Israels and William H. Painter, referred to the decision
in written statements that became part of the record in the Senate hearings, and they speculated that
implied remedies would be available under section 14(e) as well. 1967 Senate Hearings,supra note 78,
at 67, 140. See also P per, 430 U.S. at 31 (same). But only Professor Painter appeared before the Senate
committee, and the question of implied remedies was not raised during his oral testimony. There was
no senatorial comment on the issue.
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necessity of delving into the legislative history of the statute.85 Instead, Borak
was hardly noted in that decision. 8 6 The point of Cannon and the Court's other
decisions in the implied rights area was to affirm a wholly different standard
for federal courts to use if petitioned to infer private remedies from federal
statutes. Under this standard, Borak would be persuasive only if it was clear
the judicial decision to
from the legislative history that Congress understood
87
be applicable to the statute under consideration.
The third argument based on a contemporary legal context analysis is that if
federal courts had already implied private damage actions at the time of the
1970 or 1977 amendments to the Williams Act, congressional acquiesence in
those decisions may be inferred from Congress' silence on the issue. This was,
of course, the essence of the Curran decision with respect to the Commodities
Exchange Act. 88
In 1970 Congress amended several sections of the Williams Act, including
section 14(e). 8 9 But to speculate that Curran requires federal courts to recognize a private cause of action under section 14(e) because of the contemporary
legal context of the 1970 amendments is erroneous. The principal changes did
little more than increase the coverage of the Act.90 The section 14(e) amendment was not a source of controversy in the congressional committees, possibly
because the SEC already had some authority to adopt rules and regulations to
implement section 14(e). 9 1 What little discussion there was of the amendment
did not deal with private enforcement of the section. Likewise, the issue of
private enforcement had also received little judicial attention in the months
immediately following the passage of the Williams Act. 92 The only two courts
85. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
86. Borak was cited five times by the Cannon majority, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13, 698 n.23, 703 n.35, 706
n.41, 711, but only once in the text of the opinion. Id at 711. The textual reference cited Borak simply
to support the statement that implied remedies may be found under a section of a complex statute that
contains express remedies in other provisions. Id None of the other references to Borak indicate that
its holding is of any particular importance in Cannon. Id at 690 n.13, 698 n.23, 703 n.35, 706 n.41.
In Curran, a more recent decision, the Court included Borak in a single footnote cataloging cases

representing the Court's approach to implied actions prior to the 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash. Curran,
102 S. Ct. at 1838 n.56.
87. If it was clear in the legislative history that Congress was aware of Borak and intended it to apply
to the statute under consideration, then it could be said with some assurance that Congress intended the
courts to infer a private cause of action.
88. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
89. Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970).
90. The reporting requirements of section 13(d) were made applicable when a person acquires five
percent of the outstanding shares of any registered class of equity securities, as opposed to 10% in the
original Act. Id Similarly, the tender offer filing requirements of section 14(d) were made applicable to
tender offers that would result in ownership by the offeror of five percent of the outstanding shares of
any such class. Id Other minor changes were made as well, one of which empowered the SEC to adopt
rules and regulations under section 14(e) by adding to that section the following sentence: "The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative."
Id at 1497-98.
91. The Commission is authorized to adopt rules to implement section 14(d). To the extent section
14(e) "affirms" the disclosure obligations of section 14(d), see supra note 78, the express rulemaking
authority under section 14(e) overlaps with that in section 14(d).
92. Fabrikant v. Jacobellis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,686 at 99,017
(E.D.N.Y. 1970); Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 92,591 at 98,702 (N.D. Ill. 1969). See supra note 78 (discussing Fabrikantand Neumann); see
also Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 913 (D. Me. 1971), supra note 78.
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faced with the issue assumed the existence of a private cause of action, not
questioning whether one could be maintained under section 14(e). 93 It is also
of some significance that neither case appears in West's Federal Supplement.
Consequently, the decisions were not widely reported.
The legislative hisory of the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act and the
state of the law at that time stand in sharp contrast to the facts of the Curran
decision. The Curran majority noted the comprehensiveness of the 1974
amendments of the CEA,94 the consistent recognition by the federal courts of
private damage actions under the CEA, 95 and statements in the legislative history indicating a congressional intent to preserve the private remedy. 96 None
of these factors are present in the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act.
In 1977 Congress amended section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act, one of the
sections added by the Williams Act, to increase the amount of information
required to be disclosed by persons who acquire five percent of a corporation's
equity securities. 97 The amendment was part of Title II of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 that, among other things, amended section 13(b) of the
Exchange Act and added a new section 30A to that Act. In comparison to the
other portions of the legislation, the amendment to section 13(d) was very minor and was not a part of a reexamination of the Williams Act. Thus, Congress had no occasion to consider judicial developments under other sections
of the Williams Act, nor, of course, .to consider the decision of some courts to
recognize a private action under section 14(e). It would be inappropriate,
therefore, to conclude that Congress impliedly approved of those cases that
recognized private actions under the Williams Act.
A final argument based on the contemporary legal context approach begins
with reference to the 1975 amendments to the federal securities laws. 98 These
amendments have been described as the "most substantial and significant revision of this country's federal securities laws since the passage of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934."99 In view of the comprehensive undertaking embodied
in this legislation, any significant judicial interpretations of the securities laws
which were not legislatively modified were impliedly accepted by Congress.
The Supreme Court employed such reasoning in its recent decision in Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston,t°° in which it held that the existence of an express
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra note 78.
102 S.Ct. 1825, 1827 (1982).
Id at 1839-40.
Id at 1841.

97. Prior to the 1977 amendment, Section 13(d)(1)(A) simply required disclosure of the background
and identity of the purchasers filing the Schedule 13D. The amendment added disclosure of residence,
citizenship and nature of beneficial ownership. The amendment was passed against a background of
increased concern over foriegn control of U.S. corporations. The 1977 amendments also added section
13(g) to require any person who owns more than five percent of any security described in section
13(d)(I) to file a disclosure statement with the SEC. The effect of this amendment would be to require
persons who reached the five percent amount before 1970 to make disclosures, thus removing an exemption implicit under the then existing law. See S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-15, reprinted
in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4110-4115.
98. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
99. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct. 683, 689 (1983), quoting from Securities Act
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29: Hearingson S. 249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housingand Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. i (1975).

100. 103 S.Ct. 683 (1983).
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remedy under section 11 of the Securities Act does not preclude the plaintiff

from pursuing an implied remedy under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 0 1
After noting that the federal courts had, at the time of the 1975 amendments,

consistently permitted plaintiffs to proceed under section 10(b) even where express remedies were available under section 11 or other provisions, 0 2 the
Court said: "In light of this well-established judicial interpretation, Congress'
decision to leave Section 10(b) intact suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the Section 10(b) action."' 1 3 The Court cited Curran in support of this proposition.1°4
This statement in Herman & MacLean represents an extension of Curran,
because the 1975 amendments to the securities laws, unlike the 1974 amendments to the Commodities Exchange Act, were not concerned with remedial
provisions. The 1975 amendments to the securities laws effectuated no
changes in any of the express liability provisions of the Securities Act or Exchange Act, nor do the committee reports indicate any concern on the part of

Congress with implied causes of action. Rather, Congress was primarily concerned with the national market system, self-regulatory organizations and municipal securities, and it added three new sections to the Exchange Act to deal
with its concerns on these subjects.10 5 Despite the fact that Congress had specific concerns in mind, and did not legislate in an area involving implied
causes of action, a unanimous Court't 6 in Herman & MacLean found it significant that Congress left undisturbed a series of lower federal court decisions
interpreting the implied action under section 10(b).
If a similar analysis is applied to section 14(e) litigation, a case may be made
that the failure of Congress to amend section 14(e) in 1975 to deny private
actions was an implicit approval of the numerous decisions that had theretofore either implicitly or explicitly recognized private actions under section
14(e). 10 7 By 1974, four circuit courts and district courts in two other circuits
101. Id at 689.
102. Id at 689 n.21.
103. Id at 689.
104. Id
105. In all, 17 sections of the Exchange Act were amended and three new sections were added. In
addition, Congress made minor changes to the Securities Act, the Investment Companies Act of 1940
and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. The Senate Report indicated ten areas of congressional
concern: the national market system; self-regulation and SEC oversight; municipal securities; regulation of clearing agencies and transfer agencies; regulation of securities trading by members of national
securities exchanges; payment for research services with brokerage commissions; sale of investment
company advisors for a profit; commission rates; SEC enforcement actions; and institutional investors.
S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-88, reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 179-266
(1975).
106. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. Herman & MacLean, 103 S. Ct. 683, 692
(1983).
107. E.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d. 750, 769-70 (5th Cir. 1974) (suggesting private right of
action for damages may be inferred under section 14(e)); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579, 595-99 (5th Cir.) (holding private cause of action for damages may be maintained under section
14(e) by non-tendering stockholder-offerees), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846, 849 (3rd. Cir. 1973) (affirming lower court entry of a preliminary injunction under section 14(e) against tender offeror in favor of offeree), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870
(1974); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1973) (reversing denial of preliminary injunction sought by target company under section 14(e)); H.K. Porter Co.,
Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 423-25 (1st Cir. 1973) (holding defeated bidder has standing
under section 14(e) to seek damages from target and its management); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper

1324

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1311

recognized, at least implicitly, that private actions may be maintained under
section 14(e).108 Moreover, the issue had arisen numerous times in the Second
Circuit, a frequent situs of tender offer litigation, and the courts there consistently recognized a private cause of action under section 14(e), particularly for
injunctive relief. 10 9
The answer to this argument is two-fold. First, the pervasiveness of rule
lOb-5 litigation cannot be compared to litigation under the Williams Act
which, at the time of the 1975 amendments, was only seven years old. By
comparison, private actions under rule lOb-5 had been recognized for almost
30 years by 1975110 and had already been the subject of a Supreme Court
decision."' Under this response, in essence, Herman & McLean is limited to
its facts. Second, even if the courts routinely granted injunctive relief under
section 14(e) prior to 1975, damage actions were relatively rare and, thus, Congress could not have sanctioned them. The responses are persuasive, particularly on the issue of damage actions.
The contemporary legal context analysis, though not inconsistent with the
four factor approach of Cort v. Ash, circumvents the tedious examination of
each factor when legislative intent is very apparent. Thus, in Curran the Court
concluded that Congress intended to preserve the preexisting remedy'12 and,
therefore, the Court was "not faced with the Cort v. Ash inquiry."' " 3 In Cannon the Court examined all four Cort factors, but placed considerable reliance
on the relationship between Title VI and Title IX in concluding that Congress
intended that private remedies be available to enforce Title IX. 114 The legislaAircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 361 (2d. Cir.) (defeated bidder has standing under section 14(e) to sue
successful bidder and target for damages), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Gull & Western Indus,,
Inc. v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 695-96, n.14 (2d. Cir. 1973) (expressly recognizing standing
of a target company to seek injunctive relief under section 14(e) against offeror); Butler Aviation Int'l,
Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 843 (2d Cir. 1970) (recognizing target and its

president, suing individually and as representatives of the stockholders, have standing under section
14(e) to seek injunctive relief); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,
946 (2d Cir. 1969) (recognizing standing of nontendering stockholders and target company to seek
damages from tender offeror under section 14(e), but noting that preliminary relief is preferable); McCloskey v. Epco Shoes, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279, 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding nontendering shareholder has standing under section 14(e) to seek damages from the tender offeror); Peterson v. Federated
Dev.Co., 387 F. Supp. 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding nontendering offeree-stockholder has standing under section 14(e) to assert claims fbr damages and injunctive relief against tender offeror); Broder
v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312, 1323-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (preliminary injunction granted under section
14(e) in favor of stockholder-offerees against offeror); ORBANCO, Inc. v. Security Bank of Oregon,
371 F. Supp. 125, 128-29 (D. Or. 1974) (granting equitable relief under section 14(e) in favor of offeror
against target and certain of its stockholders); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374,
403 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (implicitly recognizing standing of target company to obtain equitable relief
under section 14(e)).
108. See supra note 107.

109. Id
110. See supra note 8.
I11. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9-14 (1971) (holding section
10(b)'s prohibition against the use of any deceptive device in the "sale" of any security by "any person"
applicable to sale by corporation acting through its corporate officers and applicable even though transaction not conducted through a securities exchange or organized market).
112. 102 S.Ct. at 1843.
113. Id at 1846.
114. After comparing Title IX with Title VI, the Court concluded in Cannon: "We have no doubt
that Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and
that it understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination." 441 U.S. at 703. In a footnote, the Court responded to Justice Powell's vigorous
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tive history of 14(e), however, does not make the propriety of finding a private
cause of action readily apparent. Although the contemporary legal context
approach affords some basis for finding an implied right of action under section 14(e), existing precedents do not compel such a conclusion. The traditional Cort v. Ash analysis is warranted. The second factor, focusing on
indications of legislative history, is reviewed above. The other three Cort factors are analyzed below.
The first Cort factor asks whether
The Remaining Cort v. Ash Factors.
the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted." 5 This factor can be viewed as directed to standing, rather than to
discerning whether Congress intended the courts to infer a private cause of
action. Thus, in Piter v. Chris-Craft Industries,Inc. 116 the Court held that
Congress did not intend tender offerors to benefit under section 14(e), but suggested that investors confronted with a tender offer were members of the intended class of beneficiaries." 7 Consequently, based on the first Cort factor,
the Piper Court concluded that it was inappropriate to infer a cause of action
in favor of tender offerors,8 but that it might be appropriate to find one in favor
of shareholder-offerees." 1
Although the language of section 14(e) appears to create duties on the part
of persons for the benefit of the public at large,' '9 the legislative history of the
Williams Act does demonstrate fairly conclusively that it was intended to benefit investors confronted with a tender offer.' 20 The Court seemed unreceptive
in Pitier to the argument that inferring a private right of action for damages on
behalf of tender offerors would benefit the protected class because the existence of such a right would act as a deterrent to possible wrongdoing by others
who might harm the protected class. 12 1 Indeed, in Cannon, the only Supreme
Court case condoning an implied private damage action under a Cort analysis,
the plaintiff was a member of the special class.' 22 Therefore, under the first
dissent by maintaining that "the evidence of legislative intent is so compelling that we have no hesitation in concluding that even the test now espoused by Mr. Justice Powell. . .is satisfied in this case."
Id at 703 n.34. Justice Powell argued that the Court should condone the implication of a private cause
of action only when there is compelling evidence that Congress intended one to exist. See supra note 48

and accompanying text.
115. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting from Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)
(emphasis added).
116. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
117. Id at 35, 37.
118. Id at 42 n.28.
119. The Court in Cannon so characterized the language of section 14(e). 441 U.S. at 692 n.13.
120. Piper, 430 U.S. at 26-35.
121. Id at 39-40. A similar argument was rejected by the Court in two recent cases, Northwest
Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 92-94 (1981) and Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 636-37 (1981), in which the Court refused to find an implied cause of
action for contribution under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94-95 or the federal civil antitrust laws, Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640. The possible
deterrent effect of a right to contribution was deemed irrelevant in the absence of congressional intent
that the right be inferred by the courts. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 92-94; Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at
636-37. See generalo , Loewenstein, Implied Contribution Under the FederalSecurities Laws.: A Reassessment, 1982 DUKE L. J. 543, 561-63 (discussing judicial analysis of these cases under Cor and its

progeny).
122. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 699. Curran did not depend on a Cort analysis. 102 S.Ct. at 1844. See
supra note 113 and accompanying text. The Curran Court acknowledged that "[u]nder Cort v. Ash, the
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Cort factor, if a private damage remedy is appropriate
under section 14(e), it
23
would appear to be limited to shareholder-offerees.
The third Cart factor considers whether a private remedy is consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. To the extent the possibility
of a damage award in favor of shareholder-offerees would enhance the purposes of the legislation, it is salutory to provide it. However, according to
Piper, the identity of the defendant must also be considered. This factor, therefore, is more complex than it might initially appear.
The Court expressed concern in Pper that an award of damages in favor of
a defeated tender offeror against the successful bidder would at least indirectly
be borne by part of the protected class, since they would be among the shareholders of the successful bidder. 124 If one can infer from this that the Court
would not sanction any cause of action in which the protected class bears any
substantial portion of the judgment, even indirectly, then the actions that
might be recognized would be severely limited. A non-tendering shareholder,
alleging that he was discouraged from tendering by the fraudulent actions of
the bidder, could not maintain the action if the bid was successful. Many of
the target shareholders, comprising part of the protected class, will by definition have become shareholders of the successful bidder and would be indirectly injured by any award of damages against the successful bidder.
Furthermore, assuming a bid is unsuccessful due to the fraudulent actions of
the target company, disgruntled shareholders would be foreclosed from bringing suit against their management under section 14(e) if management had a
right to indemnification from the corporation. 25 Among the numerous combinations of potential defendants and theoretical violations, the most compelling
scenario for recognizing a cause of action is one in which a target shareholder
sues an unsuccessful bidder.' 2 6 But this scenario does not often arise since a
bidder would not act in such a way as to intentionally defeat its own bid.
The objection that target shareholders may bear a portion of the damage
27
awards could be mooted by careful judicial structuring of damage awards.'
In suits by target shareholders against their own management, the court may
be able to preclude or limit indemnification of the defendant directors and
officers. 128 Similarly, in suits against a successful bidder, the damages otherwise proven may be reduced by a percentage equal to the equity ownership of
statutory language would be insufficient to imply a private cause of action under [some] of these sections." Id at 1845. In a footnote, the Court emphasized the importance of the first Cori test in a Cori

analysis. Id at 1845 n.91.
123. But cf. O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1191 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (discussed supra note 31).

124. Piper, 430 U.S. at 39.
125. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. VIII, § 145 (1974).
126. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 836-37 (5th ed. 1982) (when
tender offer not withdrawn but defeated by allegedly false statements of management and price of stock
later declines, shareholders of target company might have cause of action under 14(e) by claiming they
declined tendering opportunity in reliance on management's false statements). But see Lowenschuss v.
Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 267-69 (2d Cir. 1975) (upholding class action against unsuccessful bidder on behalf
of shareholders who tendered but whose shares were not taken because bidder enjoined from acquiring
those shares).
127. See H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424-25 (1st Cir. 1973) (suggesting
this solution).
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 145(d) (1974).
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the originally targeted shareholders in the defendant company. 129
Beyond this objection, the Court was concerned in Piper that a large damage
award might prejudice shareholders because some offers might never be
made.1 30 One would expect that any substantial risk of litigation and damage
awards would be significant in the decisionmaking process of the bidder. To
some extent this risk will have a salutary effect; it will encourage more fastidious attention to the disclosure and antifraud provisions of the law. But it will
also have a detrimental effect; it may discourage some offers from ever being
made, or adversely affect the price of offers that are made. Assessing these
possibilities is a complex undertaking required by the Con approach. The
court must decide whether the proposed implied private right is consistent with
the legislative purpose. In this connection it is noteworthy that Congress, in
passing the Williams Act, was sufficiently concerned with regulating tender
offers to run the risk that its legislation might discourage or affect the price of
some offers, because the disclosure and antifraud provisions add economic
costs to bidders that were clearly not present before the legislation. Therefore,
it is not inconsistent with the overall intended impact of the Act to find an
implied private right of action.
The final Con factor, whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law,' 3 1 calls for a consideration of the nature of the alleged violation. If the theory of the plaintiffs cause of action is that the defendant
violated an SEC rule promulgated pursuant to section 14(e) and the violation
of that rule constitutes a fraudulent "act or practice" under section 14(e), then
state law would likely have little to say on the matter. On the other hand, if
the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated some state law in connection
with a tender offer, and this violation forms the basis for a claim under section
14(e), then, arguably, the cause of action is one "traditionally relegated to state
law" and the federal courts ought not recognize it as a federal claim. 132 Thus,
to the extent that the fourth Cort factor is determinative, some alleged violations of section 14(e) are cognizable in federal court even though others are
not.
The four Cort factors, applied in this fashion, do not really resolve the question of whether Congress intended that section 14(e) be enforced through private action. Rather, the factors become policy considerations the federal
courts can look to in deciding who has standing to assert a private right of
action under section 14(e), who may be held accountable in a damage action,
129. Even if the damage award is reduced in this fashion, the book value of the shares owned by the
target shareholders will be adversely affected. The only way to fully protect the target shareholders
who tendered is to indemnify them against the loss they will suffer as a result of the payment of a
damage award, either by paying them money or increasing their equity interest in the company.

130. Piper, 430 U.S. at 40.
131. Cori, 422 U.S. at 78.
132. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 286 (7th Cir.) (Supreme Court has consistently limited federal remedy in private securities actions), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Bucher v.
Shumway, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,142, at 96,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(14(e) claim may be maintained only if conduct alleged includes form of deception cognizable under
federal law); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same). By comparison,
O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp 1179, 1184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), represents a claim under section 14(e) that could not be reformulated under state law. See supra note 31
(describing O'Connor).
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and what claims are cognizable. Those members of the Court who share the
view that a private cause of action ought not be inferred from a federal statute
in the absence of "the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended
such an action to exist"'133 could not, under this analysis, find an implied action
under section 14(e). This view is not shared by the whole Court, however, and
a majority may be willing to find that claims brought by shareholder-investors
under section 14(e) are cognizable in federal court if the claim is not one ordinarily recognized in state courts and if the damage award can be fashioned to
minimize its impact on the protected class of shareholder-investors.
B.

ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ON BEHALF OF TENDER OFFERORS

The lower federal courts have consistently held that tender offerors have
standing to seek injunctive relief against target management and competing
offerors under section 14(e). 134 These holdings are based, in part, on the suggestion in Poer that "in corporate control contests the stage of preliminary
injunctive relief,
rather than post-contest lawsuits, 'is the time when relief can
' 35
best be given." "
Citing this and other language in Pper that seemed to treat injunctive actions on a different footing than damage actions, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, in an early post-P6er decision,
Humana Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc. ,36 concluded that an offeror has
37
standing to sue a competing offeror for injunctive relief under section 14(e).'
The Humana court reasoned that if an offeror's allegations are ever to be effectively explored, they must be explored before the offer expires, so that the
shareholder-offerees will have complete and accurate information prior to that
date.' 38 Furthermore, if the allegations in the complaint were proven true and
relief was granted, the stockholders of the target company would be benefited
and, thus, the purposes of the Act would be furthered.' 39 This, the court concluded, "is the test by which a tender offeror's right to sue for injunctive relief
must be determined"-that is, are the purposes of the Act furthered?' 4 0 In the
context of a Cori analysis, the court focused solely on the third factor, and
because examination of the third factor favored implying a right of action, the
court reached that result.
Whether the Supreme Court would agree with the result reached by the district court in Humana is at least questionable. First, the Supreme Court has
applied the Cort analysis to suits for injunctive relief without indicating that
133. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (PoweU, J., dissenting).
134. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 372-73 (6th Cir. 1981); Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Humana, Inc.
v. American Medicorp, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Seegenerall Comment, An Im-

pliedPrivateRight ofAction Under the Williams Act: Tradition vs. Economic Reality, 77 Nw. U.L. REV.
316 (1982); Note, PreliminaryInjunctive Relief and Tender Offers: An Analyris under the WilliamsAct,
49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 563 (1981) [hereinafter Note, PreliminaryInjunctive Relie].
135. 430 U.S. at 42 (quoting Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,
947 (2d Cir. 1969)).
136. 445 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
137. Id at 615.
138. Id
139. Id at 616.
140. Id
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the nature of the relief sought should affect the analysis.1 4 1 Second, when
someone other than a shareholder-offeree is suing, the first Cort factor (the
especial benefit test) is still answered in the negative, 42 and the second Cort
factor (indications of leglislative intent) remains a neutral factor, neither favoring nor disapproving of private remedies.' 4 3 Finally, the Court's recent decision in California v. Sierra Club144 provides support for denying private
enforcement of the Williams Act by tender offerors.
In Sierra Club an environmental organization and two private citizens
sought to enjoin the construction and operation of certain water diversion facilities that were part of the California Water Project. 4 5 The plaintiffs alleged
a violation of section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899,146 which prohibits "[t]he creation of any obstruction not affirmatively
authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the
United States."' 47 The Court held that the plaintiffs could not maintain the
action because the Act does not explicitly create a private 48
enforcement mechanism and one cannot properly be inferred from the Act.'
In denying an implied cause of action, the Court relied on an examination of
the first two Cori factors. As to the first factor, the Court noted that neither the
language of the statute nor its legislative history indicate that section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act was created for the especial benefit of a particular
class.' 49 Rather, the statute states no more than a general proscription of certain activities, and nothing in the legislative history expands on this purpose.
The Court concluded, therefore, that the Act was designed to benefit the public
at large.' 50
As to the second Cort factor, the Court observed in Sierra Club that the
legislative history was silent on the question of congressional intent to afford or
deny a private remedy. 15 ' From this the Court concluded that "Congress was
concerned not with private rights but with the federal
government's ability to
52
respond to obstructions on navigable waterways."'
In Sierra Club the Court never examined the third and fourth Cort factors,
stating that they are of relevance only if the first two factors indicate congressional intent to create a private remedy.' 53 Thus, because the first two Cort
factors were held to be dispositive, the plaintiffs' argument for an implied right
to bring the action failed.
141. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-98 (1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
142. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 76-114 and accompanying text.
144. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
145. Id at 289-90.
146. Id at 291-92.
147. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
148. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 297-98.

149. Id at 294-95.
150. Id at 295.
151. Id
152. Id at 296.
153. Id at 297-98. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574-76 (1979) (emphasizing first two Cort factors to determine whether Congress intended to create a private right of
action).
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If a similar analysis is applied to the standing of tender offerors to seek injunctive relief under section 14(e), the same conclusion might be reached: the
statute was not enacted to create federal rights for the especial benefit of tender
offerors and there is no evidence that there should be a private remedy. Arguably, a private action for injunctive relief under the Williams Act in favor of
offerors would fail because it stands on "all fours" with Sierra Club,154notwithstanding dictum in Piter indicating that such an action is possible.
The problem with this analysis, and indeed a shortcoming of the Cart approach itself, is its overly mechanistic approach. In enacting the Williams Act,
Congress sought to increase the protection available to investors by bringing a
measure of order to a complex and sometimes chaotic area of securities practice. In this sense, one could assert that Congress intended a private right of
enforcement, or, more accurately, intended those private remedies necessary to
accomplish the Act's objectives. An attempt to find more positive indicia of
intent, one way or the other, is unavailing.
In light of Cart's effect on statutory interpretation, Congress should give
more careful consideration to whether private remedies are necessary, and if it
fails to provide private remedies in post-Cart statutes the federal courts should
refuse to infer them. But in construing statutes enacted before Cart v. Ash,155
the courts should be more flexible in deciding whether to find implied actions
and should, as the Humana court recognized, pay greater heed to fulfilling
congressional purposes. This "flexible" approach might well explain the result
as a consideration of
in Curran, although the Court expressed its conclusion
156
the "contemporary legal context" of the legislation.
Although one cannot maintain with certainity that the Court would recognize even a limited private action under section 14(e), both the traditional Cart
approach and the contemporary legal context approach afford rationales for
finding a private right. Assuming the court will recognize the existence of a
private action under section 14(e), Part III below explores the contours of such
an action, following a brief examination of section 14(e) itself.
II. A SYNoPSIS
A.

OF SECTION

THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF SECTION

14(e)

14(e)

AND ITS AMBIGUITIES

Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act' 57 has three aspects: First, in language
nearly identical to clause (2) of rule lOb-5, section 14(e) prohibits the making
of false or misleading statements; second, in language reminiscent of clause (1)
of rule lOb-5, although more similar to section 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, '58
section 14(e) prohibits "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices;" and third, in language similar to section 15(c)(1), the SEC is authorized
under section 14(e) to "define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to
154. See Poer, 430 U.S. at 41-42 (judicial relief to competing offerors can better be afforded at
preliminary injunction stage than in post-contest lawsuit) (quoting Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969)).
155. The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Cart on June 17, 1975. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
156. 102 S. Ct. at 1844.
157. Section 14(e) is reproduced supra at note 11.

158. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1976).
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prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative."
The prohibitions of section 14(e) apply "in connection with any tender offer,"
irrespective of whether the filing requirements of section 14(d) apply. 59
A few observations concerning this statutory language are in order. Although the statute prohibits the making of untrue or misleading statements of
material facts, on its face it does not require that the prohibited statements or
omissions be made "knowingly" or with the intent to deceive or defraud. In
short, there is no explicit requirement that scienter be shown to prove a violation of the statute. In 1976, however, the Supreme Court held that similar language in rule lOb-5 requires proof of scienter 160 and, as a result of that
holding, lower courts have similarly required plaintiffs in 14(e) private actions
to prove scienter. 16 1 A subsequent Supreme Court decision construed virtually
the same language in section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, however, as not
requiring proof of scienter. 162 At the very least, this latter decision suggests
that scienter may not be a necessary element if the violation of section 14(e) is
premised on an untrue statement or omission. Nevertheless, this decision does
not resolve the question since other factors ought to be considered as well,
including the legislative history of the Williams Act,' 63 the relation of section
14(e) to other sections of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,164 and what
"may be described as policy considerations" 65 in determining the elements of
66
a section 14(e) cause of action.'
A second observation of section 14(e) concerns its proscription of "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices." The word "fraudulent" does
not appear in section 10(b), although clause (1) of rule lOb-5 does prohibit the
use of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." Can it be said that by including the word "fraudulent" in section 14(e) Congress thereby intended to
expand the kinds of activities prohibited in connection with tender offers beyond section 10(b)'s prohibition? Are there fraudulent acts or practices not
already covered by rule lOb-5 in the context of purchases and sales of securities? The Supreme Court has held that an element of deception must be pres67
ent for a cause of action to be stated under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.1
1
6
8
Arguably, a fraud can occur in the absence of a deception, so that a cause of
action under section 14(e) might be premised on conduct that did not include a
159. The filing requirements of section 14(d) apply to tender offers for equity securities (1) registered
pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act; (2) of an insurance company which would have been
registered under section 12 but for a specific exemption in section 12; and (3) issued by a closed-end
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
160. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214 (1976).
161. E.g., Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982); Lowenschuss v.
Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 268 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1975); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 605-06

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341, 363-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312, 1321
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); see E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS

118-22 (1977).
162. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 (1980).

FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See infra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1974).
See infra notes 226-35 and accompanying text.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
See infira notes 285-99 and accompanying text.
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deception. 169
14e-3
Rule
is the only rule promulgated under section 14(e) that is likely
to spawn private litigation.' 7 1 The rule generally prohibits trading on nonpublic information regarding tender offers, and appears to prohibit trading activities permissible under rule lOb-5.1 72 Rule 14e-3 raises several issues relating to
the scope and purpose of section
14(e) and the extent of the Commission's
173
power to enforce the sedtion.
B.

RULE

14e-3170

III.

PRIVATE LITIGATION UNDER SECTION

14(e):

RULE

lOb-5

COMPARED

The years since 1975 have seen several Supreme Court decisions restricting
private damage actions under rule lOb-5. The Court has held that scienter is a
necessary element of a section 10(b) violation, 174 that mere breaches of fiduciary duty are not contemplated within the section, t' s that silence in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security cannot constitute a violation of rule lOb5 unless the defendant has some independent duty to disclose, 176 and that only
purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to maintain private damage
actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.1 77 These decisions rest primarily on
an analysis of the language of section 10(b) and its legislative history. 17 8 But
the message from the Supreme Court is clear: the federal securities laws are
not a panacea for all wrongdoing in which securities are involved. 179 The
169. See infra notes 300-36 and accompanying text.

170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)-3 (1980).
171. The Commission cited section 14(e) (together with sections 3(b), 10(b), 13(d), 14(d), and 23 (a))
as authority for the adoption of rules 14d-I through 14d-4 and rules 14d-6 through 14d-9, Exchange
Act Rel. No. 16384, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 82,373 at 82,577 (1979). These
rules, as well as the Regulation 14E rules other than rule 14e-3 (rules 14e-I and 14e-2) differ from rule
14e-3 in that these other rules cannot, for the most part, be surreptitiously violated, individuals violating them are unlikely to profit personally, and there is not a significant pecuniary incentive to violate
them. That is not to say that litigation challenging these rules is unlikely, but rather that private litigation seeking money damages is unlikely to occur outside of rule 14e-3.
172. See Peloso and Krause, supra note 10.
173. See infra notes 337-65 and accompanying text.
174. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
175. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977).
176. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233-34 (1980).
177. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1974). The Court departed
from a restrictive approach'of interpreting the federal securities laws in its recent decision in Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983). The Court held that an action may be maintained under
rule lob-5 even if the conduct giving rise to the action would also support an action under section II of
the Securities Act, and that persons seeking to recover under section 10(b) must prove their cause of
action by a preponderance of the evidence only, not by clear and convincing evidence. Id at 690-93.
The Court's decision in United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), might also be viewed as a
departure from its restrictive approach. In Naftalin, the Court held that the proscriptions of section
17(a)(1) of the Securities Act were applicable to frauds perpretrated on brokers as well as "investors."
Id at 771-79. To the extent, however, that the Court reached its conclusion by close attention to the
language and legislative history of section 17(a), its opinion is entirely consistent with its section 10(b)
decisions. See Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Secuirties Act of 1933 after Naftalin and Redington, 68

GEO. LJ. 163 (1979).
178. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233-34; Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477-80; Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 733-36.
179. See Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at 478. The Court's reluctance to extend the use of the federal securities
laws is most evident in its cases deciding what is a "security" for purposes of the federal securities laws.
See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-61 (1982) (bank certificate of deposit and private profit-
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lower federal courts have, for the most part, heeded this message and reduced
the importance of rule lOb-5 as a principal litigating weapon. 8 0 More importantly for present purposes, the lower federal courts have applied this philosolaws, including section 14(e),
phy to other sections of the federal securities
18
well.
as
sections
these
of
impact
the
limiting
Consistent with this philosophy, the federal courts have held that scienter is
a necessary element in a section 14(e) action'8 2 and that a mere breach of
fiduciary duty may not be a basis for an action under that section.' 8 3 Based on
principles established in other rule lb-5 litigation, the courts have also held
84
that reliance is a necessary element of claims brought under section 14(e).1
These decisions analogize section 14(e) to rule 1Ob-5 in ways that may conffict
with congressional intent and sound jurisprudence, as an examination of each
of these areas will demonstrate.

sharing agreement not securities within meaning of Exchange Act); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558-70 (1979) (noncontributory, compulsory pension plan was not a security);
United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-58 (1975) (shares issued by a nonprofit

cooperative housing corporation not securities).
180. See, e.g., Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1982) (minority
shareholder without controlling interest or access to confidential information not an "insider"); O'Brien
v. Continental Ill. Nat'l. Bank and Trust, 593 F.2d 54, 62-63 (7th Cir. 1979) (termination of trust or
agency agreement not a securities transaction); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp.
1349, 1357 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (minority shareholders who did not respond to parent corporation's tender

offer not "sellers" within meaning of rule lOb-5). But cf. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 220-21 (2d
Cir. 1977), (corporation may sue its directors and controlling stockholder under section 10(b) for causing corporation to enter disadvantageous transaction without disclosing material facts), cert. denied,434
U.S. 1069 (1978). For a thoughtful treatment of the impact of the Sante Fe decision, see Ferrara &
Steinberg, 4 Reappraisalof Sante Fe: Rule JOb-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263

(1980).
181. See, e.g., Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying Sante Fe
definition of manipulation in tender offer context); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 28788 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Santa Fe treatment of breach of fiduciary duty in tender offer context);
Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1311 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (applying Santa Fe definition of manipulation in tender offer context). See also Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco, 546 F. Supp. 795, 803 (E.D.
Va. 1982) (mere claim of breach of fiduciary duty does not lie under section 14(e)); Hundahl v. United
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1370 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (plaintiffs claim for damages under
section 14(e) dismissed on basis of Supreme Court decisions under federal antifraud laws); Bucher v.
Shumway, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,142 at 96,303 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(allegation that defendant failed to disclose breach of fiduciary duty does not transform common law
breach into basis for federal cause of action), aj'd,622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Santa Fe dictates that claims
amounting only to breaches of fiduciary duty should be decided under state law).
182. See supra note 161.
183. See supra note 181.

184. E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283-84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980); Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 373-75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 341 (1973);
Atchley v. Qonaar Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,725 at 93,643 (N.D. Ill.
1982), rep'don othergrounds, [1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,155 (7th Cir. 1983);
Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1368-69 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Berman v.
Gerber Prod. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1324-25 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co.,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,591 at 92,748 (N.D. Ill. 1969). But see Bell
v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1982); Clayton v. Skelley Oil Co., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,269 at 92,747 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); McCloskey v. Epko
Shoes, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279, 1283-84 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co., 387 F. Supp.
355, 359-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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SCIENTER

In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder i8 5 the Supreme Court held that a private
cause of action for damages under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 will not lie in
the absence of an allegation of scienter-that is, an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. 186 This holding was based primarily on the language of section
10(b): the words "manipulative or deceptive" are used in conjunction with
"device or contrivance," suggesting that the section was intended to proscribe
knowing or intentional misconduct. The Court attached particular significance
to the word "manipulative" which, the Court said, "connotes intentional or
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities."' 8 7 The Court found some support for
its conclusion in the scant legislative history of section 10(b)18 8 and greater
support in the overall scheme of the federal securities law. 189
With respect to the securities laws in general, the Court in Ernst & Ernst
noted, for instance, that the language of section 11 of the Securities Act, which
permits recovery for negligent acts, differs considerably from the language of
section 10(b), suggesting that section 10(b) cannot also cover negligent conduct. 90 Furthermore, the Court recognized that under the express civil remedy
provisions of the Securities Act, which allow recovery for negligent conduct,' 9 '
Congress imposed significant procedural safeguards, but that similar procedural limitations do not exist for the judicially created private damage remedy
under section 10(b). 192 From this the Court concluded that extending section
10(b) to cover negligent conduct would conflict with congressional intent because plaintiffs could bring causes of action under 10(b) rather than under the
express liability provisions of the Securities Act, and thereby avoid the carefully drawn procedural limitations of the express liability provisions. 193
In -the course of the Ernst & Ernst decision, the Court conceded that,
"[v]iewed in isolation, the language of subsection [(2) of rule 1Ob-5] and arguably that of subsection [(3)] could be read as proscribing, respectively, any type
of material misstatement or omission, and any course of conduct, that has the
185. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
186. Id at 193. The Court has extended the holding of Ernst & Ernst to injunctive actions brought
by the SEC. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 687-95 (1980).
In Ernst & Ernst the Court defined "scienter" as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. The Court expressly left undecided the question of whether
reckless behavior is sufficient to impose civil liability under section 10(b) and rule lob-5. Id The
federal circuit courts that have ruled on this question have decided that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement of Ernst & Ernst. Eg., Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982);
G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 959 (5th Cir. 1981); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d
1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d
38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). Given its narrowest reading, Ernst & Ernst holds
that a defendant who is merely negligent does not have the mental state required to violate section
10(b) and rule lob-5. This article uses scienter in that sense, i.e., a mental state embracing something
more than simple negligence. See generally Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562

(1972).
187. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199.

188. Id at 202-03.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id at 206-11.
Id
Id at 209-10.
Id
ld at 210.
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or
effect of defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional 195
194
brief,
amicus
an
in
SEC
the
by
not."' This reading of the rule, advocated
would have made the rule broader than the Court's reading of section 10(b)
and, therefore, would have exceeded the SEC's rulemaking authority under
For this reason, the Court could not accept the SEC's
section 10(b).
96
argument.1
The factors that convinced the Court that section 10(b) requires an allegation of scienter are not present with respect to section 14(e). The language of
the first clause of section 14(e), which provides that it is unlawful "to make any
untrue statement of material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading," is not patterned after section 10(b).
Instead, this language of section 14(e) is identical to that of subsection (2) of
rule 1Ob-5, which the Court conceded in Ernst & Ernst could be read as covering unintentional wrongdoing, 197 and which the Court essentially read as covering negligent conduct when198it construed very similar language in section
17(a)(2) of the Securities Act.
Based on the statutory language alone, a case might even be made for imposing absolute liability for misstatements and omissions in connection with
tender offers. Language in the Securities Act's section 11(a),199 which is identical to section 14(e), imposes absolute liability on the issuers of registered securities for misstatements and omissions in a registration statement, subject to the
limitations of section 1l(e).200 Experts and certain others connected with a registration statement may also be liable for misstatements and omissions contained therein. Section 11 (b) 20 1 provides a "due diligence" defense, indicating
that the draftsmen of section 11 believed that in the absence of some qualifying
language, the language concerning misstatements and omissions, standing
alone, imposes absolute liability.
The language of the first clause of section 14(e) might also be compared to
the second clause, which prohibits "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
or practices." If by section 14(e)'s first clause Congress intended to prohibit
only those misstatements or omissions that were accompanied by an intent to
deceive, or scienter, then the section is redundant because the acts and practices prohibited by the second clause include fraudulent misstatements and
omissions. Traditional statutory interpretation would reject such a reading because the first clause would be rendered meaningless. 20 2 To give the two
clauses independent significance, scienter cannot be a necessary element in the
194. Id at 212.
195. Id at 187, 212.
196. Id at 212-14. The Court also felt that the history of rule lOb-5 indicated that it was intended to
apply only when intentional misconduct was involved. Id at 212 n.32.
197. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
198. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976) sets forth the measure of damages in actions based on section l1(a).
Under section 11(a) a person who knew of the untruth or omission at the time he acquired a security
may not maintain a suit. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1976).
202. See Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976).
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first clause. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that the language of section
14(e) requires an allegation of scienter if the plaintiffs cause of action is based
on misstatements or omissions.
Just as the language of 10(b) and 14(e) differ, so do their legislative histories.
The Ernst & Ernst Court noted that the legislative history of the Exchange Act
was bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent with respect to section 10(b); but the Court was apparently persuaded by the few bits of relevent
legislative history brought to its attention suggesting that section 10(b) contemplated a scienter standard, not merely negligence. 20 3 Although the legislative
history of section 14(e) is not extensive, there is evidence that the first clause of
section 14(e) was not intended as a scienter provision. For instance, in explaining section 14(e), the Senate Report of the bill said:
Proposed subsection (e) would prohibit any misstatement or omission
of material fact, or any fraudulent or manipulative acts or practices,
in connection with any tender offer. . . . This provision would affirm the fact that persons engaged in making or opposing tender ofdisclosure of material
fers. . . are under an obligation to make full
2 °4
information to those with whom they deal.
The Senate Report, like the language of section 14(e) itself, separates the prohibition against misstatements and omissions from the prohibition against
fraudulent or manipulative acts or practices, and gives no indication that the
or with an intent to
misstatements or omissions had to be made knowingly
20 5
deceive, or with any other specific mental state.
The legislation, when viewed as a whole, together with relevent statements
made during the Senate hearings, 20 6 do not support the conclusion reached by
several lower courts that section 14(e) was intended to incorporate the pro203. 425 U.S. at 201-06.
204. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 10-11; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of the Williams Act).
205. Id
206. During the course of the Senate hearings, a panel of securities law experts, consisting of Arthur
Fleischer, Jr. and Professors Stanley A. Kaplan, Robert H. Mundheim, and William H. Painter appeared before the subcommittee. At one point Professor Kaplan commented on what he perceived to be
a significant problem: the "increasing tendency on the part of management in office to feel that it is able
to engage almost on its own in a series of efforts to continue its own control arrangements." 1967 Senate
Hearings,supra note 78, at 125. Professor Mundheim then commented: "I would say in that connection
that I would certainly favor [section 14(e)]. I think that [it] is very salutary and gets to the kind of
problem you are talking about." Id This suggests that, at least for Professor Mundheim, section 14(e)
represented something more than a garden variety antifraud provision. See also id at 131 (statement of
Arthur Fleischer, Jr.).
Professor Painter's prepared remarks pointed out the differing language among the various antifraud
provisions of the securities laws and asked whether the language of these various provisions meant the
same thing. Id at 140-41. Nothing in the legislative history suggests an answer to Professor Painter's
query.
Finally, references can be found in the legislative history suggesting that the Williams Act was patterned after the laws and rules governing proxy solicitation. During the Senate debate, for instance,
Senator Javitz remarked: "The Senator [Williams] represents to the Senate, and I accept his representation fully, that this [bill] is analogous to the proxy rules, so that very much the same principles obtain as
to what the British call a takeover, as to a proxy fight by a group of stockholders." 113 CoNo. REc.
24,665 (1967). Senator Williams responded: "this legislation is patterned on the present law and the
regulations which govern proxy contests." Id See also Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2811-13; 1967
Senate Hearings,supra note 78, at 16 (remarks of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen).
These references, together with the remarkable absence of any affirmative indication in the legislative
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scriptions of rule lb-5 into tender offer law. The Williams Act is not simply
another piece of antifraud legislation. Rather, the Act seeks to regulate tender
offer contests by positive means: the accumulation of more than five percent of
a class of registered securities must be disclosed; 20 7 a tender offer may not be
made unless certain disclosures are filed with the SEC;208 shareholders who
tender pursuant to a tender offer are afforded certain withdrawal and proration
rights;20 9 and if a tender offeror increases the consideration offered to shareholders, the increased consideration must be paid to those who tendered prior
to the announced increase. 2 10 By prohibiting material misstatements and omissions, section 14(e) serves as more than an antifraud provision; it gives meaning to the disclosure provisions in the same way that a prohibition against
material misstatements and omissions in section 1 (a) of the Securities Act
gives meaning to the disclosure requirements of section 7. 211 Like the disclosure provisions of the Securities Act, the disclosure provisions of the Williams
Act are intended to do more than merely prohibit fraud.
If anything, the legislative history indicates that the Williams Act should be
construed with reference to the proxy rules. Several statements made during
the hearings support this view, 21 2 as do statements made by Senator Williams,
the Act's principal sponsor, on the floor of the Senate during debates on the
Act. For example, Senator Williams stated: "What this bill would do is to
provide the same kind of disclosure requirements which now exist, for example, in contests through proxies for controlling ownership in a company ...
This legislation is patterned on the present law and the regulations which govern proxy contest. '21 3 Moreover, reference to the proxy rules is logical as
proxy contests are, of course, another means by which one might gain control
of a company. Materially false or misleading proxy statements violate rule
14a-9(a) 214 of the rules adopted by the SEC under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and may form the basis of a private damage action. The courts
prove that defendants acgenerally have not insisted that plaintiffs allege and
2 5
ted with scienter in actions based on rule 14a-9. 1
history that section 14(e) was intended to incorporate rule 10b-5 jurisprudence into the Williams Act,
suggest that section 14(e) should be construed independently of rule lOb-5.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).

208. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5), (6) (1976).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7) (1976).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 77(g) (1976). See supra note 78.
212. See supra note 206.
213. 113 CONG. REC. 24665 (1967). See also supra note 206 and Judge Friendly's observation comparing tender offers and proxy contests in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937, 948 (1969).
214. Rule 14a-9(a) provides:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy statement, form
of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement
which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necesary to correct any
statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same
meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1980).
215. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerstle v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-1301 (2d Cir. 1973). But see Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.,
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The leading case discussing whether scienter is a necessary element in a private damage action based on rule 14a-9 is Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,216 a
1973 opinion of the Second Circuit authored by Judge Friendly. The court
concluded that scienter was not required under rule 14a-9, noting as support
several differences between section 14(a), on the one hand, and section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, on the other hand-differences that are equally applicable to a
comparison of section 14(e) and rule 1Ob-5. For instance, the Gerstle court first
concluded that the statutory language of section 14(a), unlike that of section
10(b), does not emphasize the prohibition of fraudulent conduct but rather
indicates a congressional concern with "protection of the outsider whose proxy
is being solicited. '21 7 Similarly, at least with respect to material misstatements
and omissions, section 14(e) is not concerned with fraudulent
conduct, but
with protecting shareholders confronted with a tender offer. 21 8
Second, the court noted in Gerstle that although a negligence standard in
rule lOb-5 would undercut the express civil liability provisions of the securities
laws, 2 19 reading rule 14a-9 as not requiring scienter is completely compatible
with the statutory scheme.22 0 The express civil liability provision that concerned the court was section 18221 of the Exchange Act, which provides a private right of action to persons who purchase or sell a security in reliance upon
a material misstatement or omission contained in a document filed with the
SEC. A defense is provided under section 18 if the defendant "acted in good
222
faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading."
Arguably, a negligence standard under rule 14a-9 would be inconsistent with
the congressional intent, expressed in section 18, of providing a good faith defense.2 23 Nevertheless, the court found no incompatibility because section 18
applies to any document fied with the SEC, while section 14(a) was specifically directed at proxy regulation, and because most of the documents filed
pursuant to section 18 are not distributed to stockholders for the purpose of
inducing action. 224 These distinctions apply with equal force to section 14(e).
Applying a negligence standard to the first clause of section 14(e) in the face of
the higher standard under section 18 can be rationalized on another basis as
well: section 14(e) may be violated in the absence of a purchase or sale of a
security, which is a necessary prerequisite to an action based on section 18.225
Finally, the court in Gerstle assessed the effect of permitting a negligence
standard under section 14(a), again comparing it to rule lOb-5. In concluding
623 F.2d 422, 428-31 (6th Cir.) (scienter should be an element of liability in private suits under the
proxy rules as they apply to outside accountants), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
216. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
217. Id at 1299.
218. Piper, 430 U.S. at 35.
219. 478 F.2d at 1299. See also Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210.
220. 478 F.2d at 1299 & n.18.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
222. Id
223. It is not clear that section 18(a) is a scienter provision. Professor Loss has referred to plaintiffs
burden of proof under section 18(a) as "a first cousin to scienter." 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION
1752 (2d ed. 1961). In any event, it clearly requires something more than negligence. Ernst & Ernst, 425
U.S. at 209 n.28 ("Each of the provisions of the 1934 Act that expressly create civil liability [other than
section 16(b)] . . . contains a state-of-mind condition requiring something more than negligence").
224. 478 F.2d at 1299 n.18.
225. The same may, of course, be said with respect to proxy solicitations.
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that negligence was the appropriate standard for actions based on section
14(a), the court said:
[A] broad standard of culpability here will serve to reinforce the high
duty of care owed by a controlling corporation to minority shareholders in the preparation of a proxy statement seeking their acquiescence in this sort of transaction, a consideration which is particularly
relevant since liability in this case is limited to the stockholders
whose proxies were solicited. While "privity" is not required for
most actions under the securities laws, its existence
may bear heavily
226
on the appropriate standard of culpability.
The court contrasted this assessment with the effect of allowing a negligence
standard under rule 10b-5, which, the court surmised, would deter the laudable corporate policy of publicly disclosing important business and financial
developments. Although the court's conjecture regarding rule 10b-5 may be
questioned, 227 its conclusion with respect to section 14(a) seems sound and
equally applicable to section 14(e).
Providing a negligence standard under the first clause of section 14(e) is particularly appropriate since an obvious use of this provision would be in suits by
target stockholders against target management claiming that a tender offer was
defeated as a result of management's allegedly false statements. 228 In such a
suit, a number of factors justify a strict standard of liability: Requiring a high
duty of care is not unreasonable because management owes a fiduciary duty to
its stockholders;229 individuals in management would gain personally if the
tender offer is defeated and, therefore, they should proceed cautiously when
advising stockholders; 230 and management is under no obligation to express
any opinion with respect
to a tender offer, so that when it undertakes to do so it
23
should exercise care. '
226. 478 F.2d at 1300 (footnote omitted).
227. The New York Stock Exchange rules require listed companies to promptly release to the public
material information. New York Stock Exchange Company Manual, § A-6. Thus, for listed companies,
the incentive to release information is unaffected by the standard of culpability in a subsequent fraud
action. See generally Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521-22 (10th
Cir. 1973) (recognizing corporate duty to disclose, but holding that timing of disclosure is subject to the
business judgment rule); Vaughan, Timing ofDisclosure, 13 REV. SEC. REG. 911 (1980); Bauman, Rule
10b-5 and the Corporation'sAffirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979); Allen, The Disclosure
Obligation ofPublicly Held Corporationsin the Absence ofInsider Trading, 25 MERCER L. REv. 479
(1974).
228. As a result of the decision in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 286 (7th Cir. 1981),
the shareholders' cause of action is contingent upon an offer actually being made.
229. See Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1969).
230. The personal gain is the retention of a corporate office, which is of value even to directors who
are not otherwise employed by the company. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300
(7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, CJ., dissenting). The courts have held that this personal interest does not
create a conflict of interest that would shift the burden of proof to management to justify its actions.Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980). See generaly Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom;An UpdateA/ter One Year, 36 Bus. LAw. 1017 (1981). However, given the delicate
situation in which management finds itself, it is entirely appropriate to require management to proceed
with due care and to hold management responsible if it acts negligently.
231. Rule 14e-2 provides:
(a) Position ofsubject company. As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, decep-
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Damage actions might also be brought by target stockholders against the
bidder alleging material misstatements or omissions. These actions may include allegations that the bidder sought to discourage stockholders from
tendering to a rival bidder or, for some reason, to itself,2 32 or that the bidder
made a misrepresentation in its tender offer materials regarding the value of
the deal to the stockholders. 2 33 In any of these situations, liability should be
imposed even if the misstatement or omission was only negligent since a bidder who seeks to discourage tenders to a rival bidder is, in some respects, like
target management seeking to discourage its stockholders from tendering to a
bidder. Like management, the dissuading bidder stands to gain from successful influence, and, like management, the dissuading bidder is under no obligation to make any statements regarding its rival. Although the bidder may not
owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholder-offerees, these other factors suggest
that, like management, a tender offeror should be held to a high standard of
care in its communications with target stockholders. If the bidder seeks to
discourage certain stockholders from tendering to itself, as might happen when
the bidder has arranged to purchase a sufficient number of shares from a select
group of insiders,234 the bidder must have acted intentionally and thus the
question of the appropriate standard is mooted.
Finally, if the offering materials include a material misrepresentation, a case
can be made that liability ought to be imposed without regard to fault, at least
with respect to those matters within the knowledge or control of the bidder. If,
for instance, the bidder misrepresents the value of securities to be delivered to
stockholders in a post-offer merger, the effect of such a misrepresentation is
analogous to a misrepresentation by an issuer in a registration statement. In
both cases the investor is asked to make an investment decision based on inaccurate or incomplete information furnished by a party who seeks a certain
response from the investor. Section 1l(a) of the Securities Act imposes virtually absolute liability on the issuer for deficiencies in the registration statement, presumably because some party must be responsible for the contents of a
registration statement. 235 This same rationale would apply to tender offer
materials prepared by the bidder.
tive or manipulative practices within the meaning of the Act, the subject company, no later
than 10 business days from the date the tender offer is first published or sent or given, shall
publish, send or give to security holders a statement disclosing that the subject company:
(1) Recommends acceptance or rejection of the bidder's tender offer,
(2) Expresses no opinion and is remaining neutral toward the bidder's tender offer; or
(3) Is unable to take a position with respect to the bidder's tender offer.
Such statement shall also include the reason(s) for the position (including the inability to take

a position) disclosed therein ...
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1980).
232. Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co., 387 F. Supp. 355, 358-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (nontendering shareholder may maintain action against successful bidder who allegedly discouraged him from tendering
because bidder wanted only stock from specific group of shareholders with a controlling interest).
233. Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 1981) (tendering shareholders may maintain an
action against successful bidder who misrepresented value of preferred stock to be issued in merger);
McCloskey v. Epko Shoes, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279, 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (nontendering shareholders
may maintain suit against bidder who allegedly overstated the value of securities being exchanged and
understated consideration received by insiders in prior block purchase).
234. See supra note 232.
235. See supra note 200.
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RELIANCE

As a general proposition, proof of reliance is a necessary element of a private damage action under rule lOb-5. This requirement arose because rule
lOb-5 jurisprudence has been shaped with reference to the common law action
of deceit. 2 36 The common law insists that the plaintiff prove reliance to estabconduct and the resulting damlish a causal connection between the wrongful 237
age, a requirement typical in the law of torts.
Many rule lOb-5 actions would have failed, however, if the courts had not
recognized the difficulties inherent in a strict adherence to the common law
reliance requirement. Thus, when the rule 1Ob-5 cause of action is based on a
failure to disclose or an omission, as opposed to a misrepresentation, the
2 38
Supreme Court has said "positive proof' of reliance is not necessary.
Rather, a plaintiff need only prove that the facts withheld would be material to
combined with materiality
a reasonable investor.2 39 The obligation to 2disclose
40
establishes the necessary causation in fact.
Similarly, the courts have been troubled by the reliance requirement when
the suit is a class action 24 1 or when the plaintiff alleges that he "relied" on the
integrity of the marketplace in making his investment decision.24 2 In each of
these instances, the courts have also been willing to find exceptions to the
traditional reliance requirement.2 43 The rationale for these exceptions has genfrom a perceived need to simplify the proof of reliance in the
erally proceeded
244
given action.
Because early section 14(e) cases analogized the private damage action
thereunder to rule 1Ob-5 actions, proof of reliance was assumed to be an element of the section 14(e) plaintifi's cause of action. 245 The courts have not
been unanimous in requiring proof of reliance, and some courts have carved
out exceptions to the rule. 246 A few prominent decisions, however, such as
Lewis v. McGraw247 and Panterv. MarshallField& Co. ,248 have turned on the
absence of reliance. To the extent that the courts in these cases failed to ex236. L. Loss, supra note 223, at 1430-44; A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1Ob-5
1-6 (1981).
237. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 714-20 (4th ed. 1971).
238. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972).
239. Id at 153-54.

240. Id at 154. The Fifth Circuit has interpreted.4ffiliated Ute as holding that a material nondisclosure creates a presumption of reliance that may be rebutted by the defendant. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d
462, 468 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983); Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 261 (5th Cir.
1978).
241. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983); Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
242. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983). See
generally Note, The-Fraud-on-the-MarketTheory, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1143 (1982).
243. See cases cited supra note 241 and infra note 244.
244. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 284 (7th Cir. 1981); Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 290 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 874 (1972); Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971); R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, JR., supra note 126, at 1049-53. See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85
(1970).
245. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 184.
247. 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980).
248. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
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plain why reliance must be shown, the opinions may be criticized. Therefore,
they provide a framework for discussing the applicability of reliance in section
14(e) actions.
Lewis v. McGraw arose out of the aborted effort of American Express to take
over McGraw-Hill. 249 After the McGraw-Hill board rejected as "reckless," "illegal," and "improper" an American Express merger offer, American Express
announced its intention to make a cash tender offer for any and all McGrawHill stock.250 This tender offer was never made, however, and was replaced
with a new proposal, submitted to the McGraw-Hill board. 25' The new offer,
which was to take the form of a tender offer to McGraw-Hill shareholders,
provided for a substantially higher price than the first offer rejected by the
McGraw-Hill board, but would not become effective unless McGraw-Hill's
management agreed not to oppose it by "propaganda, lobbying or litigation. 2 52 This offer, too, was resisted by the McGraw-Hill board and subsequently expired by its own terms.2 53 The plaintiffs' action, brought on behalf
of McGraw-Hill stockholders, alleged that public statements by the McGrawHill board were false and misleading and resulted in American Express failing
to consummate the tender offer.2 5 4 This, in turn, allegedly damaged the plaintiff class because it denied the class
the opportunity to tender at a price sub2 55
stantially above the market price.
The district court in Lewis dismissed the plaintiffs' action because the complaint failed to allege that the plaintiffs relied on the defendants' misstatements
and omissions. 256 The Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that since a tender
offer was never made for McGraw-Hill stock, the plaintiffs could not have
25 7
relied on the defendants' misstatements in deciding whether to tender.
Therefore, because reliance could not be demonstrated, no cause of action
could be stated under section 14(e).
Although the outcome in Lewis may have been correct, the court painted
with too broad a brush. The opinion seems to require that any damage a section 14(e) plaintiff suffers must arise in connection with his decision to tender.
2- 8
Section 14(e) is, however, broader than the common law action of deceit.
For instance, the section prohibits fraudulent and manipulative acts-that is,
acts which might damage target shareholders whether or not the decision to
tender is influenced.
249. Lewis, 619 F.2d at 193.
250. Id at 194.
251. Id
252. Id
253. Id
254. Id
255. Id
256. Lewis v. McGraw, 495 F. Supp. 27, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
257. 619 F.2d at 195.
258. The Supreme Court recently made a similar observation with respect to rule lob-5. In Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct. 683 (1983), the Court held that the common law rule that fraud

must be proved by clear and convincing evidence would not govern actions under rule lob-5. Id at
690-92. In rejecting the common law rule, the court reasoned: "[T]he antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not coextensive with common law doctrines of fraud. Indeed, an important purpose of the
federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common law protections
by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry." Id at 691.
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Furthermore, the court's decision in Lewis makes proof of reliance the sine
qua non in section 14(e) actions, failing to recognize that reliance is important
only to establish causation. If a link between the plaintiff's loss and the defendant's violation of the statute can be shown, it should not matter if reliance
is present. In Lewis causation of a sort was alleged. The defendants' resistance
to the final American Express offer prevented the offer from going forward and
denied shareholders the opportunity to tender at an attractive price. The real
problem with the plaintiffs' complaint was the lack of any causal link between
the defendants' alleged misstatements and the plaintiffs' loss. The tender offer
failed to materialize not because the defendants made false and misleading
statements, but simply because the defendants resisted it. Management's
2 59
resistance of a hostile tender offer does not violate section 14(e).
Panter v. MarshallField & Co. 260 presented facts similar to Lewis: an announced tender offer was withdrawn before it became effective as a result of
vigorous resistance by target management. 2 6' As in Lewis, the disappointed
shareholders filed a class action against the target company and its directors,
alleging that the defendants' actions deprived the plaintiffs of the opportunity
to tender their shares.2 62 In Panter, however, the plaintiffs also alleged that
they would have sold their shares in the market but for their reliance on the
defendants' false and misleading statements, which caused them to retain their
shares.2 63 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' action failed.
Relying heavily on Lewis, the Seventh Circuit disposed of the lost tender
offer opportunity claim, stating that the requisite element of reliance was lacking.264 The Panter court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that they were unlawfully persuaded not to sell into the market, holding simply that section
14(e) does not provide a damage remedy for misrepresentations or omissions if
the proposed tender offer never becomes effective.2 65 Although this holding
would appear to make the decision one in which reliance was not a pivotal
issue, the reasoning of the opinion has a significant impact on the reliance
issue. To reach its conclusion that section 14(e) does not apply if a tender offer
does not become effective, the court reasoned that the proscriptions of section
14(e), at least in private damage actions, are limited to protecting a shareholder faced with a decision to tender or retain his shares. 2 66 This narrow
reading of the purpose of the Williams Act, and section 14(e) in particular, has
an impact on the reliance issue because, if the court was correct, the type of
259. See authorities cited supra note 167. In Lewis the court suggested that the plaintiffs' cause of
action must must rest on state law. 619 F.2d at 195.
260. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
261. Id at 281.
262. Id. at 277.
263. Id. at 285.
264. Id at 283-85.
265. Id at 285.
266. The court reasoned first that the language of section 14(e), which applies to conduct "in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request or invitation," suggests that an effective offer must
come into existence. Second, the legislative history indicates that the intent of Congress was to afford a
measure of protection to shareholders faced with a tender offer decision. Finally, the court noted the
trend of Supreme Court cases that have "continually limited the federal remedy in private federal
securities actions." For these reasons, the court denied relief when the offer does not become effective.
Id at 285-86.
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damage a shareholder can suffer as a result of a violation of section 14(e) is
limited to the loss he may suffer as a result of an incorrect investment decision
under the pressure of a tender offer. This type of loss would naturally be
caused by some type of reliance. But if, on the other hand, the purposes of the
Williams Act are broader and include protection of shareholders from the effects of false and misleading statements in the absence of reliance, then reliance is not necessarily the sole causal link between the violation and the loss.
In Panter the Seventh Circuit cited legislative history to support its narrow
reading of the the purposes of the Williams Act.267 None of the legislative
history cited by the court related directly to section 14(e); rather, it was directed to the disclosure provisions of the Act.268 Congress was apparently concerned with more than disclosure, however, as the substantive provisions of the
Act noted above demonstrate. 269 Section 14(e), which prohibits any fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive act or practice is also concerned with more
than disclosure. 270 In short, Congress was concerned with the "industrial warfare" that results when a tender offer is announced, and the damage to shareholders that may ensue. 27 1 Surely management's misleading statements made
to resist a hostile tender offer are part of that "industrial warfare" whether or
not the tender offer becomes effective. To the extent shareholders act on those
272
statements, surely they may be damaged.
Another difficulty with Panter is that while shareholders may still have a
claim for damages against their management for misleading statements made
during a pre-effective period if an offer is subsequently made, 2 73 a damage
claim will not be available to the defeated bidder.274 Thus, the decision in
Panter favors management vis-a-vis the potential bidder and runs contrary to
275
the neutrality principle that Congress sought to achieve in the legislation.
267. Id
268. Id at 286.
269. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
270. During hearings on the 1970 amendments to the Willimas Act, Sen. Williams asked the SEC to
submit a memorandum describing the problem areas it would address if granted rulemaking authority
under section 14(e). The problems delineated by the Commission included areas other than disclosure
problems and thus demonstrate that the Commission has long held the view that section 14(e) deals
with more than misrepresentations and omissions. Additional Consumer Protectionin Corporate Takeovers andIncreasingthe Securities Act Exemptionsfor Small Businessmen: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970)
[hereinafter 1970 Senate Hearings].
271. The use of the term "industrial warfare" to describe tender offer battles appears from time to
time in the course of the legislative history of the Williams Act. See, e.g., 1967 Senate Hearings, supra
note 78, at 178.
272. See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1320 (W.D. Mich. 1978). Shareholders as
a whole are disadvantaged by a rule which exempts pre-offer statements from the antifraud provisions
of section 14(e). As Judge Cudahy, dissenting in Panter, pointed out:
The type of rule which the majority advocates is simply an invitation to incumbent management to make whatever claims and assertions may be expedient to force withdrawal of an
offer. Management could speak without restraint knowing that once withdrawal is forced
there is no Securities Act liability for deception practiced before withdrawal took place. Such
a rule provides a major loophole for escaping the provisions of Section 14(e) and obviously
frustrates the remedial purpose of the Act.
646 F.2d at 310 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
273. 646 F.2d at 285; see Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980).
274. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1977).
275. At several points in the legislative history, Sen. Williams and others made it clear that the intent
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The proper approach to the reliance issue must recognize two principles.
First, section 14(e) is broader than the common law deceit action; and second,
reliance is relevant only insofar as it is needed to establish causation-if causation can otherwise be established, lack of reliance ought not dispose of a claim
under section 14(e). The judicial decisions supporting these principles are
sound because they further shareholder protection and do so in a way that
favors neither management nor bidders. 276 Under these principles management is not inhibited from resisting a tender offer, but is only prohibited from
resisting by improper means. Bidders are not liable for every material misstatement or omission, only those that cause damage to shareholder-offerees.
Finally, reliance remains an element of the plaintiffs cause of action if the
plaintiff alleges that the misstatement or omission affected his investment
decision.
C.

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

Since the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,277 a cause of action under rule lOb-5 must allege conduct that "can be
fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning of the statute. '278 In Santa Fe the Court rejected the Second Circuit's conclusion that a
complaint alleges a claim under rule lOb-5 when it alleges a breach of fiduciary duty by a majority shareholder in effecting a short-form merger under Delaware law without justifiable business purpose.2 79 The appellate court based its
conclusion on clause (3) of rule lOb-5, 280 which prohibits "an act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as fraud," reasoning that
such conduct by the majority shareholder constitutes fraud.
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not hold that a breach of fiduciary
duty is not a fraud; rather, the Court held, in an opinion paralleling its decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Jlochfelder,28 ' that the language of section 10(b) contemplates only manipulative or deceptive conduct. 282 Because the complaint in
Santa Fe alleged neither, it did not state a claim under section 10(b). The
Court recognized that the appellate court was relying on the language of rule
lOb-5, but, citing Ernst & Ernst, noted that such reliance was inappropriate:
To the extent that the Court of Appeals would rely on the use of the
term "fraud" in Rule lOb-5 to bring within the ambit of the Rule all
breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction,
of the Act is to favor neither incumbent management nor the bidder. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 24,664
(1967) (remarks of Senator Williams); Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2813 ("The bill avoids tipping the
balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover

bid").
276. See, e.g., Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1982); Clayton
v. Skelly Oil Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,269 at 92,747-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); McCloskey v. Epko Shoes, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279, 1281-83 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Petersen
v. Federated Dev. Co., 387 F. Supp. 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
277. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
278. Id at 474.
279. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462, 471
(1977).
280. Id at 1287.
281. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
282. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 471-72.
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its interpretation would, like the interpretation rejected by the Court
in Ernst & Ernst, "add a gloss to the operative language283
of the statute
quite different from its commonly accepted meaning."
Based on Santa Fe, numerous lower federal courts have held that shareholder actions under section 14(e) alleging breach of fiduciary duty fail to state
a claim under that section.284 The language of section 14(e), however, specifically prohibits "fraudulent . . .acts or practices." Therefore, if conduct that
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty is "fraudulent," it is presumably violative
of section 14(e). 285 The appellate court decision in Santa Fe is arguably still
good law to the extent it determined that a breach of fiduciary duty by the
controlling shareholder was a fraud on the minority shareholders, and the
court's reasoning, or lack thereof, is worth examining.
The appellate court decision in Santa Fe relied on three things: Earlier Second Circuit decisions which minimized the importance of deception as a necessary element in a rule lOb-5 action; 286 the Supreme Court's observation in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co. 287 that "[s]ection
10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively"; 28 8 and a statement289inthe Court's 1963 decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc. that fraud, in the sense of a court of equity, properly includes "all acts,
omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty,
trust, or confidence.. . and are injurious to another, or by which an undue
and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. '290 The appellate court
opinion, however, failed to addresss why a breach of fiduciary duty, standing
alone, is a fraud and, more broadly, whether fraud can exist in the absence of a
deception. The majority avoided these questions by reading rule lOb-5 as2 92a
proscription against unfaimess. 29 1 Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion
also failed to discuss why a breach of fiduciary duty is a fraud.
This shortcoming in the majority and concurring opinions did not go unnoticed in Judge Moore's vigorous dissent. He wrote: "It states the obvious to say
that essence of fraud is deliberate deception or concealment which is calculated
to deprive the victim of some right or to obtain, by some deceptive means, an
impermissible advantage over him." 293 Judge Moore cited only Black's and
283. Id at 472 (quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199) (emphasis added).
284. E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283-87 (7th Cir. 1981); Lewis v. McGraw,
619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Standard Metals Co., 541 F. Supp. 1109,
1112-13 (W.D. Okla. 1982); In re Sunshine Mining Co. Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1370 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Altman v. Knight,
431 F. Supp. 309, 313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
285. The notion that a breach of fiduciary duty may be fraudulent within the meaning of section
14(e) has not met with judicial approval. In re Sunshine Mining Co. Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 9, 11
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
286. 533 F.2d at 1290-92.
287. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
288. Id at 12. The Court reaffirmed this statement in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct.
683, 690 (1983).
289. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
290. Id at 194. (quoting from Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1888)).
291. 533 F.2d at 1291.
292. Id at 1294 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
293. Id at 1301 (Moore, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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Ballentine's law dictionaries to support this proposition, 294 but went on to
demonstrate that each of the earlier Second Circuit cases the majority relied
upon involved an element of deception. 295 Although Judge Moore concluded
that the defendant did not breach its fiduciary duty, he also argued, in contrast
breach of fiduciary duty and fraud "are wholly
to the majority opinion, that296
another."
one
from
different
The court of appeals opinions in Santa Fe thus join issue on whether fraud
can exist in the absence of deception. Judge Moore's observation that the answer is obvious is not borne out by a review of judicial decisions or the literature concerning the meaning of the term "fraud." Fraud is used in a variety of
contexts, only some of which involve deception. 297 The meaning of "fraud" is
294. Id
295. Id at 1301-04. In Santa Fe the Supreme Court disposed of these cases in a lengthy footnote,
demonstrating that each involved an element of deception. 430 U.S. at 475 n.15.
296. 533 F.2d at 1304.
297. Compare Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (construing a prohibition against
fraudulent entries in flight logbook as requiring proof of "(1) false representation (2) in reference to a
material fact (3) made with knowledge of its falsity (4) with the intent to deceive and (5) with action
taken in reliance upon the representation") and People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38-39,
154 N.E. 655, 657 (1926) (construing fraud in context of New York blue sky statute as including "all
deceitful practices contrary to the plain rules of common honesty") with Arlington Trust Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 854, 857-58 (E.D. Va. 1969) (construing fraudulent acts within
coverage of fidelity bond as including acts "which show a want of integrity or breach of trust") and
Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 228, 293 A.2d 682, 688 (1972) (stating in
dictum that consumer fraud statute may be violated "even though one has not in fact been misled or
deceived by an unlawful act or practice").
A number of cases finding fraud under various sections of the securities laws speak in terms of
deception, but in reality turn on findings of unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty. Typical are the
cases brought against brokers and dealers alleging a violation of the antifraud rules because of excessive mark-ups, Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 435 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1944), or excessive trading (churning), Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 425 (N.D.
Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1970). Language from the court's opinion in Charles
Hughes & Co. is telling:
Even considering petitioner [the broker-dealer] as a principal in a simple vendor-purchaser
transaction.., it was still under a special duty, in view of its expert knowledge and proffered
advice, not to take advantage of its customers' ignorance of market conditions. The key to the
success of all of petitioner's dealings was the confidence in itself which it managed to instill in
the customers. Once that confidence was established, the failure to reveal the mark-up pocketed by the firm was both an omission to state a material fact and a fraudulent device.
139 F.2d at 437. The evil in excessive mark-up and churning cases isnot the failure to disclose, but the
unfairness of what the broker-dealer has done to its customers. Consequently, bringing churning
within the proscription of rule lOb-5 has proved somewhat difficult. S. GOLDBERG, FRAUDULENT BROKER-DEALER PRACTICES 12-13 (1978) ("A rather technical chain must be forged through the Securities
Exchange Act, and the various rules adopted thereunder, in order to prove churning a violation of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5"). See also Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 840 (D.C. Cir.) (noting that the
Second Circuit has applied rule lOb-5 to nondeceptive breaches of fiduciary duty by broker-dealer),
cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 371 (1983), argued, March 21, 1983.
More recently, the Second Circuit held that an indictment charging defendant with aiding others in
violating their fiduciary duties of honesty, loyalty and silence was sufficient to allege a criminal violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15-16 (2d. Cir. 1981).
This broad concept of fraud is consistent, however, with the definition set forth in the seventh edition
of William Kerr's 19th century treatise on fraud:
The Courts have always avoided hampering themselves by defining or laying down as a general proposition what shall be held to constitute fraud. Fraud is infinite in variety. The fertility of man's invention in devising new schemes of fraud is so great, that the Courts have
always declined to define it, or to define undue influence, which is one of its many varieties,
reserving to themselves the liberty to deal with it under whatever form it may present itself.
Fraud, in the contemplation of a Civil Court of Justice, may be said to include properly all
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elusive and has prompted many writers to observe that "fraud" is a vague term
with numerous definitions. 298 By carefully choosing one's authorities and relying on selected quotations, a persuasive case can be made on either side of the
issue. 29 9
One might argue that the language of section 14(e) prohibiting "fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices" supports the conclusion that
fraud can exist in the absence of deception because, unless fraud and deception
are different acts, the section would be redundant, a result that courts seek to
avoid in construing legislation.3°° Furthermore, in light of the meticulous attention the Court has paid to statutory language in its recent securities laws
decisions, 30 ' one can easily imagine the Court saying that if Congress wanted
section 14(e) to be construed identically to section 10(b), it could have easily
done so by utilizing identical language. Failing to do this, and having purposefully used the ambiguous term "fraudulent," Congress "intended" the courts to
give broader meaning to section 14(e) than to section 10(b).
Although this argument has some surface appeal, it presumes too much regarding congressional intent. The language of section 14(e) is typical of the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws and probably was not drafted with
the care that the above analysis implicitly assumes. Little of the rather long
legislative history of the Williams Act is devoted to the meaning of the language of section 14(e). Indeed, only Professor Painter commented on it and
then only in passing. 30 2 The reports of the Senate and House committees that
held hearings on the Williams Act contained identical, cryptic comments as to
the purpose of the section. 30 3 It does not appear that the congressional commitacts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or
confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or unconscientious advantage is taken of another. All surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and other unfair
way that is used to cheat any one is considered as fraud.
W. KERR, FRAUD AND MISTAKE 1 (7th ed. 1952) (quoted in Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 543 n.4,
279 A.2d 640, 651-52 n.4 (1971)).
298. Pomeroy, writing in 1882, observed:
It is utterly impossible to formulate any single statement which shall accurately define the
equitable conception of fraud, and which shall contain all of the elements which enter into
that conception; these elements are so various, so different under the different circumstances
of equitable cognizance, so destitute of any common bond of unity, that they can not be
brought within any general formula. To attempt such a definition would therefore be not only
useless but actually misleading.
3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 11420-21 § 873 (5th ed. 1941). Professor Prosser, writing many
years later, noted that the term "fraud" was "so vague that it requires definition in nearly every case."
W. PROSSER, supra note 237, at 684. The courts have been similarly mystified by the term fraud.
299. See authorities cited supra note 297. Compare Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co.
v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206, 216 (1908) (promoter's duty was to corporation as it then existed, not as it
was contemplated) with Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 196,
89 N.E. 193, 209 (1909) (promoter's disclosure must extend beyond current shareholders to extent of
promoted plan), affid on other grounds, 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
300. See Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976).
301. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 687-702 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 195-215 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727-55 (1975). See also
John Nuveen & Co., Inc. v. Sanders, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981),denyingcert.to 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the term "reasonable care" in section 12(2) of the Securities Act
should be interpreted differently than the term "reasonable investigation" in section 11(b) of the Act).
302. See supra notes 78 and 206.
303. See supra notes 78 and 204 and accompanying text.
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tees considered the precise wording of the statute significant; if they had, a
more extensive explanation of the language would likely have been provided.
In sum, one must go beyond the language of the statute and historical precedent to determine its meaning.
Another approach utilized to determine meaning is that of Cort v. Ash.304 In
Santa Fe the Supreme Court applied Cort as an alternative basis in deciding
that section 10(b) did not cover breaches of fiduciary duty. 30 5 The Court first
identified the fundamental purpose of the Exchange Act as the implemention
of a philosophy of full disclosure. 3°6 The Court then concluded that recognizing a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty would at best serve a "subsidiary purpose" of the federal legislation. 30 7 As another reason to deny a federal
remedy, the Court noted that the action it was being asked
to recognize in
308
Santa Fe was one "traditionally relegated to state law."
Although a similar analysis might be applied with respect to section 14(e),
some differences are noteworthy. First, although Congress was primarily concerned with disclosure in adopting the Williams Act,30 9 it also expressed a concern for the fair treatment of shareholders. 3 10 The resulting presence in the Act
of substantive protections for shareholders shows that this was something more
than a subsidiary congressional concern.
The second factor of importance to the Court in Santa Fe, the existence of
state law on the subject,3 11 provides a basis for resolving the question of
whether a breach of fiduciary duty ought to be actionable under section 14(e).
Shareholders claiming that management's actions in resisting an attractive
tender offer were motivated by a desire to maintain itself in office may state a
claim recognizable under state law. 3 12 That shareholders may not fare terribly
well in such litigation 313 is no reason to federalize the cause of action. So long
as management does not issue false or misleading statements or otherwise engage in deceptive or manipulative conduct, the tender offer process can proceed as contemplated in the Williams Act. Thus, claims of unfairness that
shareholders might have can be left to the state courts.
When management's actions or proposed actions in the face of a hostile
tender offer would effectively terminate the offer, however, and would breach
management's fiduciary duty to the shareholders imposed by state law, the
bidder ought to be able to obtain equitable relief against such actions in fed304. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (setting forth Cort analysis).
305. 430 U.S. at 477-80 (1977). Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented from this portion of the
Court's opinion. Id at 480 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id at 480-81 (Stevens, J., concurring in

part).
306. Id at 477-78.
307. Id at 478.
308. Id at 478-79.
309. See supra note 1.

310. Id See also Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82.374 at 82,610 (1979) ("The congressional purpose underlying the Williams Act
was to require fair and equal treatment of all holders of the class of security which is the subject of the
tender offer").
311. 430 U.S. at 478.
312. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981).
313. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of Target's Managementin Responding to a Tender

Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1981).
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eral court. Legislative history, administrative necessity, and historical precedents all favor this conclusion. The recent Sixth Circuit decision in Mobil Corp.
v. Marathon Oil Co.314 illustrates a factual context in which breach of fiduciary
duty might have been utilized to give the plaintiff the relief it was seeking.
Instead the court chose a novel, and questionable, interpretation of the statute
to reach an equitable result.
Mobil arose out of the contest between Mobil and U.S. Steel for Marathon. 3 15 After an uninvited bid by Mobil for 40 million shares of Marathon at
$85 per share, Marathon sought a "white knight" and eventually reached an
agreement with U.S. Steel pursuant to which U.S. Steel agreed to make a
tender offer through a subsidiary for 30 million shares of Marathon stock at
$125 per share. 31 6 To help assure the success of the U.S. Steel offer, Marathon
granted it two options: First, an irrevocable option to purchase ten million
authorized but unissued shares of Marathon common stock for $90 per share;
and second, an option to purchase Marathon's forty-eight percent interest in
oil and mineral rights in the Yates Field 31 7 for $2.8 billion. 3' 8 This latter option, giving U.S. Steel the right to acquire the "crown jewel" of Marathon's
assets, was exercisable only if the U.S. Steel offer failed and another offer
31 9
succeeded.
Mobil filed suit to enjoin the exercise of the options, arguing that Marathon
failed to disclose to its shareholders material information regarding the purpose of the options, that the options were "manipulative" in violation of section 14(e), and that the grant of the options violated the corporate law of Ohio,
the state of Marathon's incorporation. 320 Underlying these arguments was the
reality that the options had damaging effects on Mobil's attempt to acquire
Marathon. The effect of U. S. Steel's Yates Field option was to decrease the
interest Mobil, or any other bidder, might have in Marathon. 32 1 As to the stock
option, because the exercise price was below the tender offer price and related
to authorized but unissued shares, the stock option had the effect of increasing
the cost to any bidder competing with U.S. Steel. For instance, Marathon's
investment banker calculated that it would cost Mobil an additional 1.1 to 1.2
billion dollars to match U.S. Steel's tender offer.3 22 Thus, the two options effectively "locked up" Marathon for U.S. Steel by deterring rival bids.
The Sixth Circuit first held that Mobil had standing to seek injunctive relief
under section 14(e) as a tender offeror. 323 It then found this "lock-up" effect
"manipulative" within the meaning of section 14(e), and thus granted Mobil's
plea for equitable relief.324 The court's analysis of the manipulation issue be314. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
315. Id at 367.
316. Id
317. Yates Field, in West Texas, has been one of the largest producing oil fields in the world. See Id
at 368-69.
318. Id at 367.
319. Id
320. Id at 368.
321. Id at 375.
322. Id at 375-76.
323. Id at 372.
324. The court effectively voided the two options, required that the shareholders be notified and
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gan with a citation to the Supreme Court's definitions of the term "manipulative" in Ernst & Ernst and Santa Fe. In Ernst & Ernst the Court said: "It is
and was virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities. '3 25 In
Santa Fe the Court offered this illustration of the term "manipulation": "The
term refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged
prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity." 326 The appellate court in Mobil reasoned that the options had the
effect of creating an artificial price ceiling in the tender offer market for Marathon stock and
therefore fell within the Supreme Court's definition of
327
manipulation.
The Sixth Circuit's conclusion in Mobil that the options constituted manipulation is at odds with the traditional meaning of the term and the spirit of the
Supreme Court's decisions from which the court quoted. 32 8 Professor Loss' discussion of the term "manipulation," 32 9 cited with approval by the Supreme
33 0
Court,
demonstrates that the term generally refers to undisclosed stock
transactions intended to mislead investors. Although the effect of the Marathon-U.S. Steel options may have been to place an artificial ceiling on the price
of Marathon stock, that alone cannot render the options manipulative because
manipulation relates to manner as well as effect. 33 ' Therefore, although an
announcement by a corporation that it will repurchase its own shares at a
given price creates a floor below which the stock price will not fall, it can not
be seriously argued that such an announcement is manipulative. By comparison, wash sales or matched orders or other schemes which might have the same
effect would be deemed manipulative. The difference is that, in the latter case,
investors are misled as to the truth, while in the former they are not. The
prohibition against manipulation was intended to deal only with the latter
case. Moreover, the significance of the Marathon-U.S. Steel options was not
their impact on the price of Marathon's stock, but their effective foreclosure of
rival bids.
The real issue in the Mobil case, therefore, was whether target management
violated section 14(e) when it undertook a course of conduct that did not involve misstatements, omissions or manipulative -or deceptive conduct but that
had the effect of eliminating the plaintiff as a tender offeror. The resolution of
given an opportunity to withdraw their shares, and ordered that the tender offer be extended for a
reasonable time. Id at 377-78.
325. 425 U.S. at 199 (quoted in Mobil, 669 F.2d at 374).
326. 430 U.S. at 476 (quoted in Mobil, 669 F.2d at 374).
327. 669 F.2d at 375.
328. The court's conclusion has also been judicially questioned. Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537
F. Supp. 413, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See also Trane Co. v. O'Connor Securities, [1983 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,146 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
329. 3 L. Loss, supra note 223, at 1529-30.

330. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476.
331. The court conceded that nondisclosure is "usually essential to the success of a manipulative
scheme," 669 F.2d at 376 (quoting from Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477), but, focusing on the effect of the
options, the court concluded that the fact of disclosure in this case would not render the options
nonmanipulative. The court said, "to find compliance with section 14(e) solely by the full disclosure of
manipulative acts as afait accompli would be to read the 'manipulative acts and practices' language
completely out of the Williams Act." 669 F.2d at 377.
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this issue should turn on whether management violated its fiduciary duty. If
management's actions were consistent with its fiduciary duty, no basis exists
for judicial interference. If, however, management's actions violated a fiduciary duty, then the Williams Act ought to afford a measure of protection, at
least to the extent of providing a cause of action for injunctive relief for the
tender offeror.332 Unlike the shareholders of the target company, the offeror
may not have a state remedy: it may lack standing to maintain an action for
breach of fiduciary duty,3 3 3 and an action alleging interference with prospective commercial advantage may not be adequate. 334 In addition, the argument
that a breach of fiduciary duty is a fraud is strongest when the complaining
party seeks only an equitable remedy. 3 35 Finally, this result is consistent with
the purpose and legislative history of the Williams Act: shareholder protection
is enhanced when the tender offeror can obtain injunctive relief to help assure
that the offer will become effective. Thus, section 14(e) should be construed as
providing a cause of action to a tender offeror to seek injunctive relief against
target management when management breaches its fiduciary duty to its
share336
holders and the effect of that breach is to thwart the offeror's efforts.
D.

TRADING ON NONPUBLIC INFORMATION: CHIARELLA AND RULE

14e-3

Relying on rule lOb-5 jurisprudence, some commentators have criticized
Commission rule 14e-3 337 because that rule prohibits certain conduct that the
332. Cf. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1981) (indicating that an employee's
breach of his fiduciary duty to his employer may give rise to a cause of action under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 in favor of third parties who might have been injured thereby).
333. Under state law, only shareholders would have standing to allege a breach of fiduciary duty by
corporate management. The tender offeror may be, but need not be, a shareholder of the target. Even
if the offeror is a shareholder, however, it is conceivable that a state court could deny it relief on the
grounds that it is seeking relief not in its capacity as a shareholder but in its capacity as a tender offeror.
Cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1977). See also A & K R.R. Materials, Inc, v.
Green Bay and W. R.R. Co., 437 F. Supp. 636, 644 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (tender offeror has no standing
under state law to challenge target management's breach of fiduciary duty). In Piper the Court noted
that plaintiff-tender offeror was a shareholder of the target company. Nevertheless, the Court analyzed
the standing issue as though the plaintiff was suing solely as a disappointed tender offeror, because the
damages it was seeking were those it suffered in its capacity as a defeated tender offeror, not a target
shareholder. Id
334. The Mobil court referred to dictum in Pipersuggesting that a defeated tender offeror may have
a common law cause of action for damages under principles of interference with a prospective commercial advantage. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 372. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 40-41. The Mobil court went on to
observe: "While such an action may be an effective common law alternative for a damage action, we
do not believe that the common law has traditionally provided an injunctive remedy that would effectively protect Marathon shareholders from nondisclosure or manipulation by the parties in the bidding." 669 F.2d at 372. See also Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 413 N.E.2d 98
(1980), in which the court vacated a preliminary injunction in favor of Belden enjoining InterNorth's
tender offer for Crouse-Hinds. Belden had argued that the tender offer interfered with its proposed
merger with Crouse. Id at 553, 413 N.E.2d at 103. The appellate court rejected this contention, setting
forth a test for obtaining relief under the theory of interference with prospective advantage: "Belden
cannot meet the requirements for interference with prospective advantage unless it makes a showing of
unfair competition on the part of InterNorth." Id
335. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963) ("Fraud has a broader meaning in
equity [than at law] and intention to defraud or to misrepresent is not a necessary element")(quoting W.
DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 235 (2d ed. 1956)).
336. Naturally, the traditional grounds for equitable relief must also be established. See Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally Note,
PreliminaryInjunctive Relief,supra note 134, at 593-94.
337. See Heller, supra note 10 at 541-46; Peloso & Krause, supra note 10, at 947-48.
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Supreme Court found unobjectionable under rule lOb-5 in Chiarella v. United
States.338 Rule 14e-3, which was adopted by the Commission pursuant to the
rulemaking authority granted it in section 14(e), generally prohibits anyone
other than the offeror from trading in target company securities on the basis of
nonpublic information relating to a proposed tender offer until the information
is made public. 3 3 9 By comparison, in Chiarella, the Court reversed the criminal
conviction of an employee of a financial printer who, in the course of his employment, deciphered the names of target companies and traded the securities
of those companies- at a profit without disclosing to the target shareholders his
knowledge of the proposed takeover. 340 The Court held that the printer had
duty to the target shareholders to
not violated section 10(b) because he had34 no
1
disclose the information he deciphered.
In Chiarella the Court grappled with the issue of who, under section 10(b),
has a duty to disclose material, nonpublic market information before trading
on that information. 342 Although the language of the statute and its legislative
history are silent on the question, the Court found support for its narrow holding in previous administrative and judicial decisions 343 and in the notion that
Congress, not the courts, should mandate the broad expansion of liability that
the government was seeking in that case. 344 The administrative and judicial
decisions the Court cited established that silence in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security may be fraudulent when there is a "duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties to
a transaction." 345 In the absence of a duty to disclose, the Court said, the defendant's actions could not violate section 10(b), despite the unfairness inher34 6 Citing Santa Fe, the Court noted that not all unfairness is
ent in his actions.
347
fraudulent.
In a footnote, the Chiarella Court dealt with the liability of "tippees." The
Court noted that a person who receives material, nonpublic information from
an insider should refrain from trading on that information or risk being34cast as
"a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of fiduciary duty." 8 Presumably, persons tipped by noninsiders are free, under section 10(b), to trade
on the information.
Two issues were left open by the Court in Chiarella.349 The first, and more
338. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Moreover, since rule 14e-3 contains a "should have known" or negligence
standard, one might speculate that it is inconsistent with the scienter standard of Ernst & Ernst. See
Peloso & Krause, supra note 10, at 945.
339. 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3 (1980).
340. 445 U.S. at 224-25.
341. Id
342. The Court distinguished "market information" from "inside information." In the context of this
case, inside information would concern the earning power or operations of the target company, while
market information would relate to the plans of the acquiring company. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231. See
generally Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An InitialInquiry into the Responsibility to DiscloseMarket
Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798 (1973).
343. 445 U.S. at 230.
344. Id at 235.
345. 445 U.S. at 230.
346. Id at 232.

347. Id
348. Id at 230 n.12.
349. The first issue was explicitly left open by the Court. Id at 221. The second issue is impliedly

1354

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1311

important, was whether the petitioner might have been convicted on the theory
that trading on misappropriated nonpublic information violates section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 because the misappropriation involves a breach by the defendant of his fiduciary. duty to his employer. This issue was not clearly before the
Court because the jury was not instructed that a breach of a defendant's duty
to his employer may form the basis of liability under rule 1Ob-5. 350 Subsequent
35
federal courts that have faced this issue have decided it in the affirmative. '
The second issue left open in Chiarella was whether possession of "inside
information" creates different duties than possession of "market information."
Inside information is information about and emanating from the target company, generally concerning its earning power or operations. Market information is information external to the company, such as information about plans
of another to acquire the company. 352 Obviously, market information often
comes from a source other than the target company. By specifically noting that
this case involved market information, 353 the opinion implied that the two
types of information might be subject to different treatment. A rationale for
treating the two types of information differently may be that private disclosure
of inside information would likely involve an insider who breached his fiduciary duty. A person who trades on that information then becomes "a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of fiduciary duty. ' 354 It is also
possible, however, for a person to obtain inside information in a way that does
not involve a breach of fiduciary duty by an insider, and it is difficult to see
why such355a person should be treated differently than the petitioner in
Chiarella.
The Commission seized upon the first of these open issues as a basis for
supporting its rule 14e-3: "The Commission continues to believe that such
conduct undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence in, the securities
markets, and that persons who unlawfully obtain or misappropriate material,
nonpublic information
violate rule lOb-5 when they trade on such
3 56
information."
Implicit in this position is a suggestion that even if section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 create the parameters for section 14(e), rule 14e-3 can still be justified
left open by the Court's specific distinction between market information and insider information. Id at
231, 233.
350. Id at 235-37. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, thought that the jury instructions covered the
misappropriation theory and, even if the instructions were deficient in failing to charge misappropriation with sufficient precision, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 243-45.
351. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981); O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
352. See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 834 (D.C. Cir.) (defining market information as information
relating "solely to the market for the securities" rather than their intrinsic value), cert.granted, 103 S.
Ct. 371 (1982), argued March 21, 1983.
353. 445 U.S. at 231, 233.
354. Id at 230 n.12.
355. Assume, for instance, Chiarella had, as a printer, worked on a press release that disclosed material, nonpublic information about the company that was issuing the release. If he traded on the "inside"
information before it was made public, it could not be said that he was participating in"an insider's
breach of fiduciary duty." See also ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603 (COMMENT (2)(1)) (PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT) (suggesting there is no reason to distinguish an "insider's" use of "market information"
from "inside information").
356. Securities Act Rel. No. 6239 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,646 at 83,456 (1980) (emphasis
added).
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because Chiarella did not reach or question the rationale for rule 14e-3. The
only problem with the Commission's position is that its rule covers a larger
class of persons than those who "unlawfully obtain or misappropriate nonpublic information." For instance, the rule prohibits a tippee from trading on the
nonpublic information if he knows or has reason to know that the information
has been acquired directly or indirectly from the offeror, the target, or any
officer, director, partner, employee, or any other person acting on behalf of the
offeror or the target. 357 Since a tippee is, in the normal case, simply told the
information, he may not be involved in a misappropriation, but would be in
violation of the rule if he had reason to know its source was the target or
offeror.
One might argue that the tippee has unlawfully obtained the information
simply by receiving it. This argument, however, assumes its conclusion. It
would mean, for instance, that if A overheard B and C discussing a proposed
takeover of XYZ, Inc., A could not trade on that information if the other requirements of the rule were satisfied because the information was unlawfully
obtained. Although this result is no doubt what the Commission intended in
promulgating rule 14e-3, it is a far cry from the undecided issue in Chiarella
and difficult to sustain on the basis of any existing precedent.
A stronger basis of support for rule 14e-3 lies in the language and legislative
history of the Williams Act. The original bill included a five-day pre-offer
filing requirement; that is, no tender offer could be made unless notice thereof
was filed with the SEC at least five days prior to the commencement of the
offer. 358 Because of the potential impact of disclosure of an impending offer,
the SEC would have been required to keep the filing confidential. Commentators objected to this provision because it increased the likelihood that trading
might occur to the disadvantage "of those innocent stockholders who sell their
shares unaware of the impending offer." 359 Deletion of this provision by Conconcerned
gress suggests that Congress agreed with the objectors and was 360
about pre-offer trading by those who knew of the impending offer.
Further support for the rule is found in the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act that, among other things, granted the SEC broad rulemaking authority to implement section 14(e). 36 1 In the course of the Senate hearings on the
proposed amendments, Senator Williams asked the Commission to give his
committee some examples of fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices
362
used in tender offers that the proposed rulemaking powers would prevent.
The Commission's memorandum in response included the following example
of a "problem area" that might be dealt with by rulemaking:
The person who has become aware that a tender bid is to be made, or
has reason to believe that such a bid will be made, may fail to dis357. 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3(a) (1980).

358. S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1967).
359. 1967 Senate Hearings,supra note 78, at 73 (statement of Donald L. Calvin, Vice President, New
York Stock Exchange).
360. Sen. Bennett, a member of the subcommittee, also expressed concern about trading on nonpublic information about a tender offer. Id at 74.
361. Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84 Stat. 1497, 1498 (1970).
362. 1970 Senate Hearings,supra note 270, at 11.
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close material facts with respect thereto to persons
who sell to him
363
securities for which the tender bid is to be made.
The Commission did not limit its concern to insiders or persons who misappropriated or illegally obtained the information. This memorandum was a
part of the public record and received no adverse comment.
It also might be argued that the rulemaking authority granted to the Commission in section 14(e) is sufficiently broad to sustain rule 14e-3. Under section 14(e), the Commission is empowered to promulgate rules and regulations
to "define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and
practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. '3 64 By comparison, the
Commission's rulemaking authority under section 10(b) does not include the
power to define manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances, nor does it
include the power to adopt prophylactic measures. Under section 10(b), the
Commission is simply empowered to adopt rules and regulations to prohibit
the manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances, consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors. That the Commission views the
powers to "define" and "prevent" as particularly broad powers is apparent
from the rules it adopted under section 15(c)(1) and (2), where similar
rulemaking authority is granted. 365 It is difficult to see why Congress would
grant such broad powers to the SEC if the SEC was not expected to have some
leeway in utilizing its powers. The practices the Commission has prohibited in
rule 14e-3 are, at least arguably, fraudulent practices, and it would appear to
be within the broad rulemaking authority of section 14(e) for the Commission
to prohibit them.
The validity of rule 14e-3 ought not be judged as though it were promulgated pursuant to section 10(b). As in the other areas of comparison noted
above, the language, legislative history, and spirit of the Williams Act support
a contrary conclusion.
CONCLUSION

Early decisions from the lower federal courts that simply assume a correspondence between section 14(e) and rule lOb-5 are questionable. From the
very existence of a private cause of action to the elements of that cause of
action, the courts have depended on developing rule lOb-5 decisions. If rule
lOb-5 was the model for section 14(e), and if Congress intended to incorporate
rule lOb-5 decisional law into the meaning of section 14(e), one might argue
that rule lOb-5 cases decided after 1968, when the Williams Act was passed,
should not be binding on the interpretation of section 14(e) if those post-1968
decisions mark a departure from prior case law. No court has so held, because
the fortunes of rule lOb-5 and section 14(e) have become so intertwined as to
obliterate any distinction between them. Indeed, in many decisions that involve both provisions, it is often unclear which one the court is discussing.
363. Id at 12.
364. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
365. 24 C.F.R. cl-I to cl-il (1982). Congressional legislation against the background of the Commission's section 15(c) rules suggests that its rulemaking authority under section 14(e) should be similarly
broad.
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The courts ought to look anew at section 14(e) and redetermine its parameters. In such a fresh look, a court might reasonably conclude that no basis
exists for recognizing a private damage action under section 14(e). However,
even if private actions are sanctioned, the courts should be alert to the differences between rule lob-5 and section 14(e) and shape the contours of each with
reference to those differences. Those differences justify the conclusions discussed above:
1. Scienter ought not be a necessary element in an action based on
the first clause of section 14(e). Negligent misstatements or omissions
may form the basis for a damage action under section 14(e) and, if a
bidder makes a misrepresentation in its offering materials, it should
be held liable without regard to fault.
2. The plaintiff in a section 14(e) damage action should not be required to prove reliance unless proof of reliance is needed to prove
causation.
3. A tender offeror should have standing to seek equitable relief
against target management that breaches its fiduciary duty to its
shareholders when that breach unduly interferes with the tender offeror's offer.
4. SEC rule 14e-3 is not subject to criticism on the grounds that the
rule exceeds the SEC's rulemaking authority. Such criticisms are
based on judicial decisions construing rule lOb-5 and the SEC's
rulemaking authority under section 10(b). Section 14(e) is, however,
broader than section 10(b), as is the SEC's rulemaking power under
section 14(e). These factors validate a rule that might not withstand
scrutiny under section 10(b).

